CHINA AND RUSSIA EMERGE AS MAJOR THREATS TO INDO PACIFIC SECURITY POST-UKRAINE EUSSIAN INVASION.

 Indo Pacific strategic calculus in terms of regional security and stability has undertaken a major shift post-Ukraine invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2002 wherein Russia as a latent threat now emerges as a 'Major Threat' compulsively added to the pervasive China Threat in play more markedly since 2013.

The China-Russia Axis was already in play in various shades, hues, and combinations in the Indo Pacific Region. Post-Ukraine Invasion, the strategic and economic dependency of Russia stands greatly increased.

Russia has no options left post-Ukraine but to embrace China strategically fully and to ditto and underwrite China's predatory aggressive moves in IndoPacific.

The Russia Threat has not manifested itself in terms of massing of military formations on the Pacific littoral but has manifested itself in stark geopolitical terms with enhanced confrontationist stances against United States and hardening of policy attitudes towards Japan.

With India, despite India making great efforts to keep its traditional relations with Russia, the old flavor stands lost. Russia along with China resent India tilting strategically towards the United States.

In strategic terms, while Rusia may not be in military adversarial mode with India, but it can be said with certainty that Russia is no longer a "countervailing asset' for India against China.

Russia, has lately, increasingly participated with China in military, naval and air-force joint exercises. Notably Russian Air Force combat aircraft have participated in Joint Air Patrols with Chinese Air Force in close proximity of Japan and South Korea---both strong Allies of the United States hosting US Forward Military Presence in their territories.

Russia has so far not condemned increased North Korea's ballistic missile tests overflying Japan as China's proxy in the Region.

The crucial question that now arises from this Russian pattern above is whether Russia will actively participate in any inevitable US-China armed conflict?

Going by present indicators with Russia weakened militarily and economically, chances of Russia actively fighting alongside China in a US-China armed conflict are remote. However, Russia opening a second front in the European Theatre to lessen US & Allies military pressure on China in the Western Pacific cannot be ruled out.

Concluding, in the overall context, Russia as a Major Threat alongside China as partner in the China-Russia Axis will continue to figure in Threat Perceptions in the strategic calculations of United States and the West both in the Indo Pacific context and in the European context.

This perception gets reinforced by the fact that both China and Russia are ruled by Communist dictators, wherein both have shown scant respect for international conventions and a Rules-based international order. South China Sea predatory moves by China and Ukraine Invasion by Russia are pointers to unpredictable aggressive impulses of China's and Russia's present rulers.

JAPAN DOUBLES ITS DEFENCE BUDGET TO COPE WITH ENHANCED CHINA THREAT PERCEPTIONS & POST-UKRAINE LESSONS

Japanese PM Kishida rightly described December 16, 2022, as a "Turning Point" in Japan's national security and defence policies when he announced doubling of Japan's Defence Budget from decades-old limit of 1% of GDP to 2% of GDP in response to enhanced China Threat perceptions and military lessons post-Ukraine invasion by Russia.

Japanese PM Kishida unveiled a $ 320 Billion Five Year Plan which would make Japan the world's third largest military spender. 

Japanese Armed Forces were already a potent military force, but its radius of action was self-imposed to immediate defence of Japanese Islands.

Japan's new National Defense Strategy will impart Japanese Armed Forces with conventional 'Second Strike' Capabilities against China.

Japan's enhanced China Threat perceptions have arisen from China's military intimidation of Taiwan and open display of military might by intrusions in airspace and waters around Taiwan.

China has been indulging in submarines and Chinese Navy ships intrusions in Japanese waters. 

In Japanese Threat Perceptions, China's military occupation of Taiwan coupled with China's Full Spectrum Dominance of South China Sea would be strangling Japan's lifelines of energy supplies and trade.

Post-Ukraine invasion of Ukraine by Russia, Japan has drawn tow important military lessons (1) Russia has set a wrong precedent of unprovoked invasion of a smaller neighbor, and which precedent may encourage China not only for military occupation of Taiwan but also Chinese military occupation of disputed Japanese Senkaku Islands.

The second major lesson that Japan has drawn post-Ukraine is that Japan must now militarily be prepared for a prolonged conflict and have military infrastructure and logistics sustainability for prolonged warfare.

Japan's new major military spending doubled to unprecedented levels therefore caters for the twin challenges of (1) Enhanced offensive military capabilities and 'counter-strike' capabilities against its perceived enemies, and (2) Rapid buildup of military logistics infrastructure and WWR (War Wastage Reserves) of holdings of reserve stocks of weapons, military equipment and ammunition to fight and militarily sustain the Armed Forces in event of prolonged conflict.

Reflecting Japan's new resolve to meet enhanced new threats to Japanese security, Japan released three important Documents (1) National Security Strategy (2) National Defense Strategy, and (3) Defense Forces Development Plans.

Surprisingly, reports indicate that nearly 70% of Japanese public supports Japan raising its military preparedness. This is a marked departure from the past normally pacifist inclinations of Japanese public.

The only vociferous opposition to Japan's doubling of defence expenditure has emanated from China which has accused Japan of whipping up regional tensions as pretext to breakthroughs in defence spending. Surely, Japan's acquisition of 'Counter Strike ' capabilities would have a

rattled China.

Concluding, it needs emphasis that Japanese Defence Buildup to credible proportions against enlarging China Threat was overdue. China itself has to blame for pushing Japan in this direction.

In terms of overall Indo Pacific security, Japan's enhanced defence buildup and assertive security profile would impose a cautionary deterrent to China's unrestrained aggressiveness in the region.

'THE SAMURAI HAS ARISEN!!!

UNITED STATES- JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA SECURITY TRILATERAL CRYSTALLISING IN 2022

Geopolitical realities unfolding in Indo Pacific in wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China Threat of Taiwan invasion, Russia-China Axis solidifying and North Korea as China's nuclear proxy destabilizing the Korean Peninsula with repeated missiles tests has forcefully dawned on South Korea the imperatives of regional security resting on a US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral.

US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral was a Strategic Imperative even in Cold War I when Russia Threat was at its peak. In Cold War II, China Threat to Indo Pacific has emerged in more menacing contours surpassing the erstwhile Russia Threat. 

Geopolitical and strategic imperatives are therefore more pressing in 2022 closing weeks for speedy integration and operationalization of the US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral.

Initial moves in this direction were visible from November 2022 onwards with Defense Ministers and senior military officials from the three countries holding consultations.

It needs to be recalled that the United States has Bilateral Secuity Treaties with Japan and South Korea. The missing piece in this security geometry in Western Pacifici was an integrated US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral.

For decades, the resistance to this pressing triangular security mechanism stemmed from South Korea opposing it for no other good reason than perceived historical wrongs of South Korea over Japanese colonial rule over South Korea in the last century.

South Korea's reluctance in the past also arose from China being able to drive a wedge in Japan-South Korean relations t suit its strategic ends. In this direction China's economic inducements to South Krea were manipulated by China.

Fortunately, the situation has changed with the Conservative President Yoon taking over the reins of power in Seoul this year. President Yoon realized that South Korean policies of past Presidents of 'Reconciliation' with North Korea had failed miserably when contextually viewed against North Korea's blatant military provocations in the last one year.

Analytically, lurking in South Korea's new policy calculations of positive approach towards a US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral would be the stark realization that China despite professions of friendship towards Soth Korea had not actively restrained North Korea - its satellite, from aggressive provocations against South Korea, leaving Japan aside.

Perceptionaly, it appears that China wanted North Korea to intensify its aggressive provocations of missile firings post-Ukraine War by Russia. It suited China in diversion of attention from its Taiwan military adventurism and also US sole strategic focus on assisting Ukraine against Russia 

South Korea too like United States and Japan has significant stakes in security and stability of Western Pacific and South China Sea which China has disrupted with its aggressive moves.

Concluding, in interests of overall Indo Pacific security considerations, Western Pacific security and more specifically stability and security of the Korean Peninsula, the crystallization of the US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral needs to be welcomed as a mature security imperative well recognized.

INDIAN NAVY CHIEF'S SIGNIFICANT PRESENCE AT QUAD NAVAL CHIEFS SUMMIT MEET IN TOKYO NOVEMBER 2022

 Significantly strategic messaging stood conveyed by Indian Navy Chief Admiral Harikumar's presence in the opticals of the four Naval Chiefs of QUAD Navies posing together in a formal photograph of the QUAD Naval Chiefs Summit in Tokyo, Japan on November 05, 2022.

Significant it was, as if memory serves me correctly, this was the first time that a Naval Chiefs of QUAD Nations has taken place.

Significant strategically, was the conflictual backdrop of Indo Pacific prevailing turbulent security environment induced by China's saber-rattling over Taiwan, Chinese satellite North Korea's proxy missiles firings across Japan and the overhang of Russia Invasion of Ukraine casting shadows on IndoPacific security.

In a strategic triple whammy, which would not have gone unnoticed in Beijing, the QUAD Naval Chiefs Summit in Tokyo also coincided with Japan's Internatinal Fleet Review, commencement of the 'Malabar Navl Exercises' in Japanese seas of QUAD Navies and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.

The Indian Naval Chief 's presence was scheduled at all these events.

Significantly, in my assessments over decades, is the reality that while Chinese Navy may be numerically stronger in numbers of Navy combatant ships, but the Japanese Navy is "Qualitatively Superior" and more powerful than the Beijing's Chinese Navy.

When QUAD Navy Chiefs main theme of discussion focusses on "Interoperability" then the strategic message should be amply clear. They had not met in Tokyo for a garden party! 

Humanitarian and disaster relief missions overplayed by Indian diplomacy are overshadowed by the real intent of QUAD when it was resurrected in 2017. The real intent is checkmating China and the maritime threats that China poses in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Concluding, it needs to be stressed that India must invest more heavily on the strategic intents of QUAD Nations and make it more potent in naval terms. It should not be forgotten, as I have stressed in my writings and even on TV Channels, that India can keep the Indian Ocean as "Indian" against China's naval depredations only with deep collaboration of QUAD Nations Navies. 

In overall pursuance of India's national security interests, India should now refrain from de-emphasizing of QUAD's real strategic intent. The QUAD Naval Chiefs Summit meet in Tokyo seems to be the first step in that direction.

When Q

CHINA'S ENHANCED AGGRESSIVENESS PORTENDED UNDER PRESDENT XI JINPING'S UNPRECEDENTED THIRD TERM

 Chinese President Xi Jinping having ruthlessly ensured an unprecedented third term as President of China with absolute control over the Communist Party apparatus and the PLA military machine portends enhanced aggressiveness for Indo Pacific which abounds in China-generated flashpoints.

President Xi Jinping's signature tune in his earlier two Presidencies was adding incendiary contours to China's military aggressiveness and brinkmanship on all of China's peripheries extending from India's Himalayan Frontiers with China Occupied Tibet to the maritime domains of the Western Pacific, notably South China Sea.

President Xi Jinping's ascendancy to power in Beijing in 2012 was significantly marked by China's switch from 'Soft Power' policies to exercise of   'Hard Power' political and military intimidation of its Indo Pacific neighbors.

China's aggressiveness under President Xi was not limited to its Indo Pacific neighbors but also extended to 'challenge' United States supremacy in Western Pacific. China's establishment of 'Full Spectrum' dominance over the South China Sea under President Xi was only belatedly challenged by United States President Trump and thereafter.

 In my assessment, Chinese President fortified by Chinese PLA massed military and naval power and emboldened by United States strategic distraction to Europe over Russia's invasion of Ukraine could be tempted to flex his military muscles on its Indo Pacific peripheries.

China's enhanced aggressiveness during President Xi's third term on its peripheries is also likely to be generated by domestic compulsions of diverting growing political and economic discontent by whipping up Chinese Nationalism.

Concluding, China's enhanced aggressiveness in Indo Pacific assessed as likely during President Xi Jinping's third term because of contextual factors needs to be checkmated by "Enhanced Security Content" of QUAD and forging a US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral. Indo Pacific nations included ASEAN cannot afford to be divided on the China Threat.

UNITED STATES AND INDIA CAN GEOPOLITICALLY ILL-AFFORD STRATEGIC DENOUEMENT AGAINST CHINA THREAT

United States and India in 2022 post-Ukraine can ill-afford to be in strategic denouement with each other when geopolitically measured against the China Threat intensely impacting both United States and India besides generating overall security turbulence in Indo Pacific.

In end-2022, this precisely seems to be underway, seemingly, when the dots are joined of geopolitical events and developments involving United States and India in the aftermath of Ukraine Invasion by Russia which suggest that hairline cracks are threatening the US -India Strategic Partnership.

Strategic Partnerships to be robust thrive on 'Mutual Strategic Trust' and respect for each other's strategic sensitivities. But the opposite seems to be taking place in US-India relations post -Ukraine Invasion by Russia.

Objectively and sequentially analyzing the developing strategic perceptional differences the stage seems to have been set by India with its diplomatic reluctance to condemn Russia over its Ukraine Invasion where Russia indulged in a virtual genocidal 'War of Choice' without any provocations from Ukraine.

Seven months down the line, India is still not naming Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Major Powers and Major Powers-in-the making should have strengths and resilience to take major challenging geopolitical decisions. 

India's reluctance to decouple itself from its 'Russia Obsession' was patiently borne by United States accepting Indian perceptions that India's dependence on Russia weaponry inhibited India from doing so. During this period United States did not even invoke CATSA sanctions against India for purchase of S-00 ADM systems.

However, in end-2022 United States geopolitical patience seems to have been worn out and joining the dots of US-end generated steps suggest that United States strategic denouement with India is setting-in.

Notably, US $ 450 million F-16 upgrade package to Pakistan, postponing Pakistan's $ 140million debt repayment, week-long ongoing visit of Pakistan Army Chief to US, and significantly the Trilateral Defence Ministers Meeting of QUAD Nations in Hawaii of USA, Japan & Australia, minus India, are ominous for India.

India therefore crucially now stares at the following challenges:(1) Geopolitically in 2022 when global geopolitics have turned on its head post-Ukraine Invasion by Russia in favor of United States, should India persist with its 'Russian Hangover'? (2) Global geopolitics in end-2022 is revolving around 'Balance of Power' power-play and offers no bandwidth to India for 'Multilateralism' (3) How long India can keep trading its geopolitical weightage to United States without exhibiting its intentions to be a serious player in "Security Roles" of Indo Pacific security? (4) How long India can "Shirk from Calling Out the China Threat at World Forums"?

Concluding, it needs to be stressed that both United States and India cannot have different perceptions on the China Threat. If that be so, then the Indian answers to the above questions should be obvious.

 The US-India Strategic Partnership forged at the turn of the Milennium was predicated on the China Threat and that hovers more threateningly post-Ukraine. United States and India should therefore not permit any 'Strategic Distrust' to hover above the robustness of US-India Strategic Partnership.

N

FRANCE AND INDIA SHARE GSIGNIFICANT STRATEIC CONVERGENCES ON CHINA THREAT TO INDO PACIFIC SECURITY

The China Threat to Indo Pacific security and stability has implicitly been taken cognizance of by France and India during the recent September 2022 visit of French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonne to New Delhi. Going by the assertive statements made on imperatives of a 'Free & Open IndoPacific' the strategic convergences indicate that both France and India intend intensifying jointly their strategic cooperation towards Indo Pacific security. 

Notably, unlike India, which is a late entrant into the domain of Indo Pacific security, France has a military presence in both the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean on its island territories in terms of military, naval and air bases.

France based on Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean garrisons has at its command appreciable intelligence acquisition and force projection capabilities in both these Oceans.

France is the only major European Power to have the above capabilities in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

The above contextually becomes vital especially in the South Pacific Islands nations where China's intrusive presence is adding yet another strategic concern to Indo Pacific security.

India on the other hand is a Member Nation of the US-led Quadrilateral Security Initiative comprising United States, Japan, Australia and India. 

The QUAD is for all practical purposes a 'China-Deterrent' security grouping despite QUAD other members deferring to Indian hedging on naming the China Threat by applying non-security labels.

France like India has crafted a web of bilateral security relationships with countries in the Indo Pacific in addition to India like Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand.

Superimposing the French and Indian templates of security relationships the Indo Pacific on each other, what emerges is a mosaic of over-lapping convergences between France and India on Indo Pacific security which can contribute handsomely to the existing US-led security architecture.

In relation to the China Threat, the same now   figures in European Union and NATO perspectives of which France is a member.

 Significant scope therefore lies for both France and India in intensification of their Strategic Partnership with strong convergences on Indo Pacific security and stability.

 

 

INDIA'S STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES TO VIEW R USSIA AND CHINATHROUGH RUSSIA-CHINA AXIS PRISM

India's policy establishment in 2022 has to grapple with the challenge that in terms of policy planning it now has to base its foreign policy perspectives on the emerged reality of the Russia-China Axis as a power bloc in direct confrontation with the Global Democracies headed by the United States and includes India.

Reflecting on this aspect was an assertion made by me in an analytical piece in Eurasia Review onSeptember 1 2022 on the evolving Cold War 2.0 polarised environment, isxna AThe intensifiction of the Russia-Chiisxna Axis andia its implications for Ind

 The most significant points made in this Analysis were 

• Russia and China cannot be the vectors of Indian foreign policy."
• "Inia cannot be on wrong side of global geopolitics and global polarization."
• "During Cold War 2.0 India will have no bandwidth to revel in tadeonal foreign policy shibboleths of Non-Alignment, Non-Alignment, or Strategic Autonomy."
•  "India should not send confusing signals to Global Democracies that it still has lingering affections for the Russia-China Axis."

India can no longer strategically afford to base its policy perspectives on Russia and China as two separate entities but adopt the policy planning prism of the Russia-China Axis as a "Geopolitical Whole" and a   'Strategic Whole'.  

No further proof is required of Rusia-China Axis having been operationalized than the Rusia-China Axis in play on India's doorsteps in South Asia marginalizing India on Afghanistan furthering China's and Pakistan's strategic interests.

Russia's policy profile in the last five years amply denotes that when Russia will be faced to make choices between respecting China's strategic sensitivities and India's strategic sensitivities, Russia would unhesitatingly side with China.

Russia would accord priority to Russia-China Axis strategic objectives in relation to its overall confrontation with United States led Global Democracies than to honor India's lingering strategic obsession that Russia would at best stay neutral.

India opting for 'virtual alignment with Global Democracies' in terms of Indo Pacific security mechanisms does not require amplification. What requires amplification is that India has to make tough choices of openly asserting its strategic preferences and choices.

If Indian PM Modi has boldly shed all the shibboleths of India's Nehruvian foreign policy what holds PM Modi with his indomitable outlook to "DECOUPLE" India from India's self-imposed Russian manacles?

India's intentions, other than 'Risk Aversion' instincts of Nehruvian hangovers lingering in Indian foreign policy establishment, seem to drive India's lingering attachment to Russia despite Russia making its intentions clear on the concretizing of the Russia-China Axis.

Concluding, it needs forceful emphasis that Inda's rise to a Major Global Player can only be facilitated by the Major Powers of Global Democracies and not by Russia and certainly not China and the Russia-China Axis. So why India's diffidence in terms of unambiguous assertion of its strategic preferences and directions?

UNITED STATES-INDIA MILITARY ALLIANCE IS A STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE FOR INDIA IN 2020s CONTEXT

Geopolitical churning and strategic uncertainties generated by the institutionalizing of the Russia-China Axis post-Ukraine, has imposed a Cold War 2.0 Template on global security, and particularly of the Indo Pacific of which India is now a pivotal part.

Unlike Cold War 1.0 where India could revel under Nehruvian delusions of Non Alignment and indulge in moral pontifications to the world, that subterfuge for a non-assertive or 'Risk Aversion' foreign policy is no longer available in evolving Cold War 2.0 Template to India.

Contextually, the arenas of global flash-points during Cold War I.0 were distant from India. In the unfolding Cold War 2.0 scenario the global conflictual flash-points are right at India's doorsteps along the Himalayan Heights astride which an overly aggressive China sits menacingly.

India's Western Security Flank is a threatening flank with possibilities of a Two Front War imposed on India by the China-Pakistan Axis.

The Indian Ocean  which India traditionally predominated stands intruded by Chinese Navy, Chinese Navy submarines and China's sea-dominance being unfolded by access to China's debt-ridden States like Pakistan and Sri Lanka naval bases at Gwadur and Hambantota.

These threatening scenarios raises some crucial questions, namely, (1) Can India on her own defence capabilities without external involvement withstand China's strategic onslaught blueprint against India (2) Can India on her own naval might contend with China's aim to dominate India's sea-flanks? (3) Can India's policy establishment realistically not divine China's strategic blueprint to block India's rise as a Major Power?

Regrettably for India the answers to all of the above crucial questions vitally affecting India's sovereignty and security are in the "negative".

The fast-track military buildup and indigenous defence production initiated by the Modi Government would take another ten years to provide effective conventional deterrence. It has to first catch-up with ten years of "Neglect of India's War Preparedness" of Congress Governments 200-14.

In the context of desirability of military alliances as a bulwark against wayward and aggressive 'Revisionist Powers'the recent Ukraine Invasion by Russia becomes a quotable example. Would Russia have launched a massive invasion of Ukraine if it was a NATO Alliance member-State?

Concluding, when the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership has evolved in 2022 in visible contours of a 'Virtual Military Alliance' with integrated security mechanisms and with India part of QUAD and I2U2 , what holds back India from endowing the 'Virtual Military Alliance' with United States with the honorific of a "US-India Military Alliance"?

This is the realistic 'Strategic Option' for India whose geopolitical and strategic time has arrived. 

UNITED STATES TAKE GLOBAL LEAD IN REPUDIATION OF "ONE-CHINA POLICY"

 Geopolitical dynamics in play in 2022 dictate strong imperatives for the United States to give a global lead in repudiation of the "One China Policy" mistakenly perceived and   adopted since 1972. In the wake of this policy, China has emerged not only as the 'Prime Threat' to US national security but also has emboldened China to contest United States traditional strategic predominance in the Indo Pacific.

The spillover from the above has tempted China to aggressive brinkmanship and conflict on all of China's peripheries from India's Eastern Ladakh borders with China Occupied Tibet to South China Sea.

Repudiation of "One China Policy" by United States would set in motion similar diplomatic de-recognition of "One China Policy" an  lead to full recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign independent nation.

What can China do in the wake of United States repudiation of the "One China Policy" with other nations too following the US lead?

Can China go to war on this count  against the United States  and other countries doing so similarly?

China in 2022, long pointed by me since 2015, is strategically besieged both externally and internally. China has by its aggressive actions is virtually isolated diplomatically. Major Nations of the Indo Pacific are in "diplomatic sufferance" of China sheerly because of United States strategic ambiguities on China.

China's economy is no longer vibrant and possibly downslide  further due to broken supply chains and loss of confidence in China's economic credibility especially as after-effects of China not owning up on Wuhan Virus 19 emanating from biological warfare experiments political power struggle from Wuhan laboratories.

China's domestic upheavals can be predicted arising from possible economic miseries and domestic political power struggles challenging President Xi Jinping.

Contextually therefore China is in no position to go to war on the question of repudiation  by United States of the "One China Policy".

Concluding it needs emphasis that China in decades post-1972 was all along "boxing much above its strategic weight" due United States policies of 'China Hedging" and 'Risk Aversion'. United States by doing so has enabled emergence of China as a demonic aggressive Power with Hitlerian impulses. High time the United States "DE-THRONES"China for its own good and security.

UNITED STATES SHOULD NOT BE STRATEGICALLY DISTRACTED FROM INDO PACIFIC BY UKRAINE WAR

Russia's invasion of Ukraine underway should not lead United States to repeat its historical mistake of the first decade of 21st Century wherein its strategic distractions in Afghanistan and Iraq, in the vacuum so created, facilitated China to build up its Blue Water Navy and predatory dominance over South China perceptions--- both moves creating perceptions of United States as a Declining Power.

China's recent strategic forays deep down in South Pacific Island Nations is a stark reminder how China exploits strategic inattentiveness. United States and Australia had taken for granted that the South Pacific is their area of influence.

China in 2022 has thus acquired monstrous and menacing monstrous military profile, so much so, that it now feels emboldened not only to coerce US Allies and Strategic Partners in Indo Pacific, but also strong enough to directly challenge United States predominance.

US President Biden's recent statements that the United States would focus more on European security amounts to wrong political signalling to both China and to QUAD partners of United States in Indo Pacific. 

China would very much welcome diversion of US strategic focus from Indo Pacific security China-centric challenges to Europe. China would also welcome even the US strategic focus to be divided between Indo Pacific and Europe.

In both cases above US strategic focus, fully or divided, offers China military bandwidth to expand China's military signatures in the Indo Pacific. 

China's recent predatory moves in South Pacific evidently highlights how strategic vacuums enable China to gain strategically.

The United States should leave the 'Defence of Europe' to European Nations  and  goad  'Free Riders' like Germany riding on US security commitments to Europe, to shoulder European security load.

Concluding, it is my assessment that there is and should not be any predicament for United States to choose between European Security and Indo Pacific Security. In the third decade of 21st Century, it is China and its menacing predatory moves in Indo Pacific that vitally threaten US National Security in the coming decades.

QUAD SECURITY DIALOGUE GROUPING SHOULD BE ENLARGED TO QUAD PLUS 3 POST-UKRAINE

Russia's invasion of Ukraine this year not only has endangered European security but significantly creates graver implications for Indo Pacific security   necessitating QUAD to be enlarged by admitting South Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia as members of QUAD.

Maintaining that Russian invasion of Ukraine was a Europe-centric security threat not impacting Indo Pacific security would be strategically incorrect. Russia has a seaboard on the Pacific Ocean around Vladivostok and in proximity to South Korea and Japan.

 Russia is also in a Virtual Military Alliance with China which poses exponential threats to Indo  Pacific security. Russian and Chinese strategic convergences focus intensely in 2022 to prompt US military exit from Western Pacific.

Increasingly visible in 2022 are joint Fighter Aircraft  Combat Patrols of Chinese and Russian Air Force in close proximity of Japan and South Korea.  

 Also visible is Chinese Air  Force Fighter aircraft 'buzzing' provocatively  US Air Force, Canadian Air Force and Australian Air Force surveillance planes on routine patrols over South China Sea international airspace.

All of the above are provocatively hostile activities  by a belligerent China and now a belligerent Russia post-Ukraine both in challenging confrontational postures against United States- led QUAD countries.  

The enlarged threat to Indo Pacific security releases urgent imperatives to enlarge the membership of QUAD. 

I would strongly recommend that QUAD be enlarged  to QUAD Plus 3 to include South Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia. All of these three countries have pivotal strategic locations in Indo Pacific with special reference to Western Pacific and South East Asia ---all crucial to Indo Pacific security.

JAPAN'S SECURITY IMPERATIVES DICTATE FAST-TRACK NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL ACQUISITION

Japan's  volatile and unpredictable hostile security environment in 2022 with China, North Korea and Russia as adversarial nuclear powers creates inescapable security imperatives to acquire a fast-track acquisition of Nuclear Weapons Arsenal. Contextually, Japan's imperatives in 2022 outweigh the imperatives when I first advocated this imperative in 2002 and thereafter in my writings. 

Japan's imperatives to urgently acquire a Nuclear Weapons Arsenal becomes critical when viewed from the perspectives of Japan's security impacted by Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine with active but covert support of China. 

The emergence of Russia-China Axis was a foregone conclusion and this unholy Axis of  self-willed two Communist Dictators  with powerful military might and nuclear weapons arsenal coupled with their propensity to impose their will in their neighbour-hoods should be an eye-opener for Japanese leaders, Japanese policy establishment and the Japanese people.

When to the Russia-China Axis  Nuclear Weapons Arsenal is added the Nuclear Arsenal of theirs protege 'Rogue State' of North Korea, Japan should awaken to the nightmare of being cowed into submission by "Nuclear Blackmail" by Russia, China and North Korea. 

Japan's security is as it is plagued by territorial disputes with both Russia and China on its Northern and Southern extremities. North Korean missiles test firings overflying Japan is ample indicator of North Korean intentions.

Japan so far for decades has been relying on the US 'Nuclear Umbrella" for its security against nuclear threat from China and Russia. But as events in Ukraine's invasion by Russia and United States and NATO's timidity have amply indicated that Japan can no longer solely rely on United States for its security against nuclear threats by Russia, China and North Korea.

The United States should contextually welcome and encourage Japan acquiring a Nuclear Weapons Arsenal to redress the the Nuclear Weapons Arsenals in the Indo Pacific.

Concluding, as I well know from the 1980's when I was on a diplomatic assignment, Japan  was only a 'Screw Driver Turn"away in terms of developing Nuclear Weapons. In 2022, threatening nuclear blackmail by Russia, China and North Korea, place a higher call on Japanese Nation to shed its inhibitions and secure its future by developing a Nuclear Weapons Arsenal.

UNITED STATES "CHINA THREAT" CHALLENGE OPTIONS 2022--MANAGEMENT OR CONTAINMENT?

The "China Threat" to United States national security, security of US Allies in Western Pacific and to US strategic partners in Indo Pacific Region  has manifested itself in 2022 in decidedly threatening terms, short of war. The United States faces the stark choice in 2022 of adopting deterrent 'China Containment' strategies against an aggressive China or continuing with its ambiguity- muddling strategy of  'China Management'.

China's decidedly hostile confrontational stances were fully evident when China threw the military gauntlet against the United States by establishing Full Spectrum Dominance' over the South China Sea, indulged in political and military coercion of Japan and forcibly occupied Philippines and Vietnamese Islands in South China Sea and constantly threatening a military invasion of Taiwan

The latest Chinese military provocation against the United States is to threaten the invasion of Taiwan by hostile intrusion of Chinese Air Force Fighter Jets and Bombers in attacking formations, into Taiwanese air-space.

China stands emboldened to do so by United States timid military forbearance arising from decades of United States successive Administrations adopting the "China Management"  strategy premised on strategically inadvisable precepts of 'China Hedging'  and 'Risk Aversion'.

United States policy formulations and strategies premised on "China Management" have totally failed to deter China from threatening US 'Core Security Interests' in Indo Pacific Region. 

The US Policy establishment, if it has failed to join the dots of China's hostile intentions and military provocations against US national security interests and global influence, open themselves to charges of gross dereliction of protecting vital US security interests and denting US influence both in Indo Pacific and worldwide. 

The above then reinforces Chinese incessant propaganda that the United States is a "Declining Power"  and thereby denting US image as the reigning Superpower and a 'Nett Provider of Indo Pacific Security. 

Can the United States afford such an irreparable loss of its global image against a Revisionist Power like China? Should not United States in 2022 not seriously switch from its failed policies of 'China Management' to active "China Containment ? 

Concluding, all contemporary and unfolding indicators portend that a China emboldened into an ascendant trajectory by decades of US permissiveness on Chinese intents can now only be checkmated by United States with active "China Containment" policy. History beckons so.

 

 

 

JAPAN AS FRONTLINE STATE FOR UNITED STATES IN WESTERN PACIFIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE-2022 REVIEW

Japan's National Security threat perceptions in 2022 are overwhelmingly dominated by the China Threat which has emerged as an unprecedented menacing and predatory threat posed by Communist China to Indo Pacific security surpassing in potency the Soviet Threat that hovered during Cold War 1.0.

Japan's natural choice to ensure its national survival against the Soviet Threat earlier and now the more aggressive China Threat lay with the United States. This was achieved through the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty which also facilitated US Military Forces to be positioned in Japan as US Forward Military Presence numbering over 40,000.

The United States despite having imposed a Peace Constitution on Japan after World War II limiting Japan's security to Self Defense Forces, soon realized, that not only security of the Japanese Mainland but also the overall security of  Continental USA rested on Japan as the pivotal component of US-configured security architecture in the Western Pacific, earlier against the Soviet Threat and in the 21st Century against the much more potent China Threat.

During Cold War 1.0 against the Soviet Threat, the Japanese Self Defense Forces were incrementally made to share the security of sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) extending to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan across the South China Sea expanse. Denial of Japanese Straits for Soviet submarines to breakout into the Pacific was also a major task.

The enormity of the China Threat to Western Pacific security, Japan's security per se, and to Continental USA that has unfolded in the first decade of the 21st Century has prompted the United States to shed its earlier misgivings about re-emergence of Japanese militarism (fostered by China and lapped up by US), has now given way to the United States even encouraging Japan to acquire offensive and Force Projection capabilities for Japanese Armed Forces.

Japan today is engaged in a sustained drive in the above direction. Reports also indicate of the conversion of the two Helicopter Carriers of Japanese Navy into mini- Aircraft Carriers to operate F-35s. Missile ranges are also being doubled.

Japan is actively participating in joint patrolling of the South China Sea and capacity-building of Navies of Vietnam and the Philippines besides investing in the security of other South East Asian countries perceiving the China Threat.

Japan is an active member of QUAD and has forged substantive defence relationships with India and Australia--all supplementing the overall effort of securing the Indo Pacific against Chinese expansionism.

Concluding, all that one can emphasize is that Japan in face of the China Threat menacing the security of Indo Pacific Region has emerged even more distinctively as the most pivotal component of the US-configured security architecture not only for the Western Pacific but even for the overall  Indo Pacific Security architecture to checkmate the China Threat. Japan today is involved in that direction with United States, India and Australia---with European Nations also pitching in now.

 

JAPAN-AUSTRALIA DEFENCE AGREEMENT :Deterrence Noose Tightens Against China

Ominously, the recently signed Japan-Australia Defence Agreement 2021 portends the tightening of the Strategic Deterrence noose against China both in terms of their strategic weight and also that yet an additional layer is added over and to the Indo Pacific security architecture led by the United States.

Japan and Australia are Major Powers of the Indo Pacific strategically located in the Northern and Southern segments of the Pacific Ocean. The strategic weight of Japan in Indo Pacific security arises from their long-standing durability as enduring Allies of the United States through the decades-old US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States Alliance).

Additionally, Japan and Australia are members of the QUAD Security Initiative and Australia recently became member of AUKUS comprising Australia, UK and US-- the three member Nuclear Submarines Alliance, with planned transfer of US nuclear submarines technology to Australia.

In 2022, the geopolitical picture obtaining is that Japan and Australia intensely perceive the China Threat  as a strategic concern for their respective national security interests. Both Japan and Australia in recent ears have been at the receiving end of China's political and economic coercion.

China has in recent years been making determined forays into Southern Pacific smaller island nations over which Australia had enjoyed strategic influence.

Logically therefore, it was natural for Japan and Australia to establish a strong Defence Partnership providing complimentary security weightage to each other bilaterally,  over and above, their respective security treaties with United States.

Japan and Australia can now be expected to intensify their military exchanges and joint exercises to cater for contingencies arising in the Western Pacific because of China's depredations in South China Sea, threats of Taiwan invasion and meddling in South Est Asia. Japan and Australia share strategic convergences on these aspects.

Japan-Australia Bilateral Defence Agreement needs to be strategically viewed as an insurance by both countries to cater for any contingency of an unlikely isolationist impulses that sometimes afflict the United States polity.

Concluding,in terms of overall Indo Pacific Security Template the Japan-Australia Defence Agreement besides adding another weighty strand to the web of security relationships that have emerged as "Strategic Deterrence" to China's threatening postures in the Indo Pacific also portends and signals the 'firm intentions'  of United States, Japan, Australia and India to deter China in different combinations from its wanton aggressive impulses.