Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

Friday, July 10, 2020

India’s National Security Strategy 2020 Inescapable Imperatives-- “China Containment”

 

China presented itself as India’s ‘Implacable Enemy’ when a China Occupied Tibet obliterating Independent Tibet as a centuries old buffer state in 1950,  China imposed  its borders with India on India’s Himalayan Watershed  raising irredentist claims against India on centuries-old established geographical frontiers.

China in 2020 with its military adventurism in Eastern Ladakh sequentially and relentlessly following seven decades of similar military provocations violating multiple China-India Border Agreements, emboldened by “China Appeasement’ and ‘Risk Aversion’ policies of past Indian Governments leaves no political or strategic space for India other than adopting a firm policy of “China Containment”.

China foisted a militarily adventurist borders dispute on India which China has perpetuated for 70 years defying all reasonable solutions. Chi has deliberately impeded solution of China Occupied Tibet-India Himalayan Border Dispute as any demarcation resulting from satisfactory solution would rob China of leverages against India of political and military coercion.

Fast forwarding history of China-India conflictual relations and border turbulences inflicted by China ‘Slow Creep’ of nibbling away at Indian Line of Actual Control on pretext of ‘Perceptional Differences” on alignment of the demarcated Line of Actual Control, interspersed with the Sino-India War 1062 and the 1967, 1975 and 1986.87 major China-India militany standoffs the picture in Mid-May 2020 is “Grim”.

China –India Military Confrontation in 2020, as I have reflected in my Book ‘China-India Military Confrontation: 21st Century Perspectives’ in 2015 and my various Papers and Lectures thereafter is that China-India Military Confrontation is no longer a mere “Boundary Dispute” but has graduated into the realm of Asia’s most pronounced and defining geopolitical rivalries with long term strategic implications.

Geopolitical rivalries draw-in other Major Powers with stakes in Asian Security and more pointedly in the new geopolitical construct of Indo Pacific, and especially when Asia’s two Major Powers are militarily jostling each other on their contested borders with massed military strengths.

Contemporaneously, it needs to be highlighted that in the backdrop of the current intensifying China-India Military Confrontation in 2020 is marked by two major factors—one geopolitical, and the other military.

Geopolitically, China in 2020 is geopolitically weakly placed, both regionally and globally. This arises from global concerns of Major Powers that China is on a wild aggressive rampage across Indo Pacific reminiscent of Hitler’s unchecked rampage across Europe on eve of World War II in late 1930s.

The military factor that pervades and rattles China in 2020 is that especially in the period 2014-20 under current Indian PM Narendra Modi, India has fast-tracked its border defence infrastructure in Eastern Ladakh in terms of roads, bridges and forward airfields in close vicinity of Indian Territory of Aksai Chin militarily usurped by China in 1050s to build the Chinese Highway through it linking China Occupied Tibet with China Occupied Xingjian. China perceives that India’s developed border infrastructure makes both the Aksai Chin Highway and China’s flagship Pakistan project of CPEC Highway passing through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

Additionally, India in the last six years India has started closing in the asymmetrical differentials in its military power with China in conventional military power. India has achieved credible nuclear deterrence with China with Beijing under India’s missiles ranges.

it is against this geopolitical and military backdrop that the current Galwan Military Clashes and Standoff needs to be viewed and analysed.

India after 70 years has finally shed its ‘Political Timidity’ in facing China’s relentless mix of political and military coercion on the Line of Control, China’s relentless offensive to downsize India and to impede India’s emergence as an Emerged Power.

In Mid-2020, India’s relations with China can be characterised as one of intense “Strategic Distrust” of China, and to use the Chinese phrase applied by China to its friendship with its ‘Iron Brother’-Pakistan’ that India’s ‘Strategic Distrust’ of China is as “High as the Himalayas and as Deep as the Indian Ocean”.

Seventy years of ‘China Appeasement’ and ‘Risk Aversion’ policies of past Indian Governments has resulted in India reaching a ‘Tipping Point’ in post Mid-May 2020 Eastern Ladakh military clashes inflicted by PLA Chinese Army resulting in PM Modi assertively declaring that “Era of Expansionism is Over”

 This assertion was made by PM Modi on his visit to HQ 14 Corps and troops of Ladakh Garrison facing China’s massed Army formations in China Occupied Tibet. The Indian Prime Minister without naming China but abundantly and unmistakeably aimed this expression at China made in context of Galwan clashes.

 The assertion ‘Era of Expansionism is Over’ and that India’s Sovereignty will be defended at every inch was putting China on notice of India’s intent that henceforth in relation to Chinese military misadventures against India on the Line of Actual Control will be militarily contested with matching Indian military force.

The ‘Expansionism’ reference was very apt and timely because China in the period 2004-14 of Congress Government had nibbled away at Indian Territory in Ladakh to expand its military presence in Eastern Ladakh contested space on Line of Control claimed by China as per their perceptions.

The Indian Prime Mistier has given full control to Indian Army Commanders along India-China Occupied Tibet Borders to deal with PLA Chinese Army military provocations, intrusions and transgressions displaying an unprecedented political trust in India’s Military Commanders facing Chinese Armed Forces might.

Where does India go from here in terms of its National Security Strategy in face of China’s intensifying military escalation along the Line of Control and its stubbornness in not agreeing to disengage and deescalate and respect the military status quo ante as it existed in Eastern Ladakh as it existed on May 05 2020 when China first clashed with Indian Army in Galwan Area and which led to two weeks later of the May 15 clashes in which Indian Army lost 20 soldiers lives and China had 43 soldiers killed by ferocity of Indian Army troops foiling the Chinese Army attempts to enlarge its presence in Galwan Valley.

At the time of this writing, it is being reported that China has reluctantly started making token withdrawals from the clash-points in Eastern Ladakh but not from the Pangong Lake area.

 China under contemporary geopolitical pressures may seemingly be giving up its stubbornness of not restoring status quo ante by token and partial disengagement and de-escalation. But that should only be deemed as a politically expedient step but not a credible change in China’s implacable hostility or cessation of its military adventurism and brinkmanship in times to come.

The Indian Republic has to guard against unnecessary hype with such developments as stated above or celebrate any forthcoming Chinese disengagement of troops in Eastern Ladakh or de-escalation.

The Indian Prime Minister with the contextual backdrop of May-July 20202 Chinese military adventurism should finally recognise and concede that China despite his political outreaches to the Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan Informal Summit 2017 and Chennai Informal Summit 2019 is lathe to give up Chinese military adventurism on India’s Borders with China Occupied Tibet.

Objective analysis by even impassioned political observers would concede that in 2020 viewing the geopolitical dimensions that now dominate China-India Military Confrontation, no political or strategic space exists for India to hope that “Expansionist China” would be amenable to any Conflict Resolution or Confidence Building Measures.

India in 2020 has now seriously deliberate and consider that contextually in terms of Indian National Security Strategy India has only one prudent policy option to undertake, and that is one of “China Containment”

India’s ‘China Containment” will obviously be frowned upon in Indian policy establishment and diplomatic circles but wisdom should dawn on them that historically “Revisionist Powers” bent on imposing an “Expansionist Template” need to be checked by “Containment Strategies” by all Powers---Major or Small-= - in unison before Indo Pacific security and stability is irretrievably fractured.

India cannot be a back-bencher and shy away from “China Containment” when China seemingly and demonstrably by its military adventurism is inviting such a reaction.

India’s “China Containment” strategy would necessarily be multi-pronged—political, economic and military and architectured with long term perspectives in view and more importantly unmindful of and independent of any politically expedient Chinese policy reach- outs to wean away India from India’s adoption of the Indo Pacific Security Template by the multilateral “QUAD” Initiative.

Detailed recommendations for “China Containment” strategy that India should put it motion would be the subject of analysis of a separate Paper.

Concluding, it needs to be asserted that with a case for “China Containment” policy by India having been established above, despite the opposition of India’s ‘China Apologists’ and ‘;Non Alignment Gladiators” of yore, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has the onerous task of finally dispensing India’s decades old ‘China Appeasement’ and ‘Risk Aversion’ policies of past Congress Governments. China’s Expansionism can only be curtailed by headlong push-back with a National Security Strategy of “China Containment.

 

 

 

 

 

The Indian Republic has to put in motion the process of a devising a new National Security Strategy. Inherent in such a new Strategic Blueprint would be a realisation that the ‘China Threat’ is LIVE and unlikely to fade away. It also entails incorporating in such a new Strategy the inescapable strategic imperative of “China Containment”.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Monday, May 11, 2020

UNITED STATES & CHINA'S RECORD ON SECURITY IN INDO PACIFIC COMPARATIVELY ANALYSED

Ever since the end of the Second World War in 1945 with United States overwhelming victory over Japan and the emergence of Communist China in October 1950 as a Communist dictatorship in the then Asia Pacific, this Region has been characterised by strategic turbulence generated by Communist China unceasingly from the 20th Century and persisting as the second decade of the 21st Century draws to a close.

The question that begs an answer against the above backdrop is as to why the conflictual propensities of China have not watered down with passage of time of nearly 70 years? Why is that China after having embraced modernisation and globalisation facilitated by the United States generous impulses to ease China into the global system as a responsible stakeholder in regional security still persists with its aggressive impulses against China's neighbours with scant respect for international laws and conventions as is being seen in South China Sea against Vietnam sharing Communism ideology affinity with China?

Simply, the answer is that China is a "Revisionist State" which has a national agenda and blueprint to change the power and security structures in then Asia Pacific and now the enlarged Indo Pacific Region.

China perceives that the Western Pacific on whose littoral Mainland China resides is China's own backyard and wishes to transform all the 'Seas' from East Chin Sea to the South China Sea as one enlarged 'Inland China Sea' and that the United States is the interloper in the Region.

However, ironically for China, the nations in Western Pacific from South Korea, to Japan and the Philippines fearful of China imposing its writ of a 'China-Centric' geopolitical order and security system repose their trust in the United States and perceive that in the ultimate analysis the United Sates is the sole guarantor of their national security and the Indo Pacific Regional Security.

This then brings us to a brief comparative analysis of the demonstrated records of United States and China in the maintenance of peace and security in the Indo Pacific Region.

The analytical comparison is starkly against China and perceived as such in Asian capitals. China is perceived as the "Regional Destabiliser" intent on overturning the existent geopolitical and security template in the Indo Pacific and the harbinger of conflict, instability and Indo Pacific "Disorder" with attendant disruptive uncertainties.

The United States is perceived as the "Nett Guarantor of Regional Security" reinforced by United States challenging China's repetitive propensities for armed conflict commencing with the Korean War, through the Vietnam War and now China's aggression and brinkmanship in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Straits.

More importantly, the United States generously assisted war-ravaged economies of Japan and South Korea to emerge as 'Asian Tigers' with high economic rates of growth and with democratic political systems. Even China's stupendous economic growth rates would not have taken place without US FDIs and high technology inputs.

In terms of future perspectives two crucial questions emerge contextually. Firstly, will the United States commitments to Indo Pacific Region continue steadfastly into the coming encodes? Secondly, can China be expected to emerge in the coming decades as a responsible and benign stakeholder in Indo Pacific Security?

Taking the second question first, as United States policy formulations are wholly dependent on China restraining its historical imperialistic impulses, the answer is a big NO. China's national impulses contradictorily intersect with any moves to emerge as a responsible stakeholder in the Indo Pacific

China is convinced that the United States stands as the 'bulwark' restraining China from imposing its own China-Centric geopolitical and security order in Indo Pacific and thwarting the 'Great China Dream' of Chinese Preside Xi Jinping who after capturing all the instruments of State Power in China, political and military, has further secured 'For Life' the office of China's President.

China under President Xi Jinping will obstinately stick to his 'Great China Dream' whose advent was marked by China switching from strategies of 'Soft Power' to 'Hard Power' manifested by intensified aggressive brinkmanship.

China will try all conceivable strategies to prompt a 'US Military Exit' from Western Pacific by inducing 'domestic political fatigue' in United States by China's disruptive 'Salami Slicing Strategies'.

Regrettably for China, the Indo Pacific geopolitical landscape today is characterised by 'Intense Polarisation' against China due to its aggressive brinkmanship and intentions to carry out a 'Revisionist Transformation' in the Indo Pacific.

Written by me elsewhere for years that China itself is to blame for this sorry and adverse image of China. What US diplomacy could not achieve for 50 years China handed the Asian polarisation on a plate to the United States.

In my assessment, the United States is hardly unlikely to endanger the 'Outer Western Pacific Defense Perimeter' of Mainland United States resting on nations of Western Pacific allied to the United States. Even the Philippines as a prodigal son is returning to the US-fold.

 Strategic imperatives of US National Security will ensure that the United States remains firmly embedded in the Indo Pacific.

United States transforming the US Pacific Command to 'Indo Pacific Command' under US President Trump reflects United States enlarged and intensified commitments to Indo Pacific Security stiffened by revised US threat perceptions that China cannot change and will continue as a 'Threat" to US Security and the security of its Allies and Strategic Partners like India.

Succeeding US Presidents can be expected not to lower the thresholds of US National Security against a militaristic China.








Wednesday, May 6, 2020

UNITED STATES AND CHINA’S COMPETING NARRATIVES IN INDO PACIFIC REGION 2020


United States and China have played out competing narratives in the earlier Asia Pacific ever since China emerged in October 1949 as a Communist giant monolithic State. Competing narratives of United States and China in mid-2020 have assumed hotly contentious confrontational contours in the now enlarged Indo Pacific Region.

United States and China’s competing narratives spin around fundamentally on the respective strategic goals of these significant major rivals on the security and stability of the Indo Pacific Region.

United States-China competing narratives are now no longer determined by ideological considerations of the Cold War era but now stand graduated to an intense geopolitical and military confrontation between China and United States as they jostle for power and influence over the vast maritime expanses of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and adjoining littorals with littoral countries nudged into taking sides.

Notably, the United States narrative on Indo Pacific draws many Asian capitals to United States point of view as in mid-2020  China suffers from ‘Severe Strategic Distrust’ in Asian capitals arising from its South China Sea military adventurism in wake of switching to ‘Hard Power’ strategies.  

The United States attaches prime importance to the Indo Pacific Region as the Western Pacific nations of Japan. South Korea and the Philippines tied in bilateral security alliances with the United States provide the Outer Perimeter of the defence of the US Homeland.

China perceives the Western Pacific as its maritime backyard and perceives Japan, South Korea and the Philippines (not now) with US Forces Forward Military Presence as springboards for possible US military interventions against China.

It needs to be highlighted that outweighing the above is the maritime significance of the Western Pacific sea-lanes traversing the South China Sea from the Straits of Malacca to the East China Sea in proximity of Japan and South Korea.

Conversely these sea-lanes traversing South China Sea are also the lifelines for China’s energy needs and commerce.  Besides the economic dimension the Western Pacific is perceived by China as its natural sphere of dominance as an aspiring Superpower challenger competing against the United States.

Tersely termed, the United States stands firmly embedded in the Western Pacific ever since August1945 with sizeable forward deployment of US Military Forces, US Air Force and US Navy and China as an aspiring Superpower wishes to prompt a United States military exit from the Western Pacific leaving the field open for China’s political and maritime aggrandizement.

The pursuit of respective United Sates and China’s strategic narratives has reduced the Asia Pacific Region earlier and now the enlarged Indo Pacific Region in United States and China in varying states of confrontation and conflict.

China’s propensity to engage United States in armed conflict extends from the Korean War of 1950-53, the Vietnam War of the 964-1972 and interspersed with military brinkmanship in the Taiwan Straits, against South Korea and Japan.

The United States contrastingly under the misperceptions of President Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initiated a China Appeasement policy till recent years, followed by decades of ‘Risk Aversion’ policies against China.

China resultantly for decades stood emboldened to advance its Grand Strategy by intrusive political and military strategies in East Asia, South East Asia and South Asia. All this resulted in dents in US image all over Asia as a guarantor of security and stability in Asia.

Sensing the above but tied down by pressures of US ‘Risk Aversion’ strategies, the United States passed through various stages of its China policy formulations ranging from ‘Engagement’ to ‘Congagement’ and now in mid—2020 to teetering over ‘Confrontational Conflict’. 

The better part of the 21st Century seems destined to witness political and military turbulence in the Indo Pacific Region as the United States and China play out their competing narratives in a region which witnesses in mid-2020 a China facing a hostile isolation from Major Asian Powers whose national security interests have a strategic convergence with those of the United States as regards China.