INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY DOMINANT PRECEPT IN POLARIZED WORLD 2024 SHOULD BE -"ALLIED BUT NOT ALIGNED"

India's foreign policy cannot operate in a vacuum divorced from global and regional geopolitical environment. The global regional environment is heavily polarized in 2024 between United States & Allies and the two Communist States, Russia and China.

The Indo Pacific geopolitical environment of which India is a pivotal nation reflects the global polarization even more intensely due to Communist China's predatory aggressiveness against all its peripheral neighbors. chiefly, India.

Perceptionaly, India's pattern of strategic partnerships and engagement present an indisputable picture of India being a 'Natural Ally' of the United States and West.

The above is indisputable especially in the case of India's highly institutionalized security mechanisms with the United States which have evolved over two decades. While both United States and India shy away from terming it as China Threat-centric but the reality is that it is so.

In this heavily polarized geopolitical environment, more sharper after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2023 and China consequently raising its military provocations against Taiwan, the confrontations both in Europe and in India Pacific have intensified. 

India's continued 'Strategic Partnership' with Russia is a hangover relict of the heyday of India's Non-Alignment era. This relationship has multiple contradictions when viewed against contextual geopolitical global and regional environment.

Russia is in a 'Military Alliance 'with China but for the name. China figures topmost in India's threat perceptions. Russia is therefore ill-placed to act as India's 'Countervailing Power' against Chinese aggression because of Russia's heavy reliance on China linkages.

Russia also has not displayed any inclination to prevail over China to desist from hostile activities in South Asia inimical to Indian security interests.

Russia's only utility to Indian foreign policy interests is as a source of cheap oil supplies and which utility can be assessed as transactional in nature. With India's reduced reliance on Russian armaments the Russia-India relationship can be at best viewed overall as transactional.

Consequently, the crucial and pertinent question that India's foreign policy planners are posed with is what imperatives exist for India's obsession with a 'multipolar world order' or 'multilateralism' as a foreign policy precept.

Will these two Indian foreign policy precepts be adequate to serve India's national security interests in a heavily polarized geopolitical environment?

What these two foreign policy precepts generate in global geopolitical dynamics is ambiguity on India's strategic directions and postures. 'Strategic Ambiguity' has cost India heavily in the past both strategically and economically.

Should India go down again on that path of Indian foreign policy postulations? 

India in last ten years has projected to the world that it intends to play the role of a Major Power in global affairs. Such a national aspiration cannot be achieved nor sustained by multipolarity or multilateralism.

The above Indian 'National Aspiration' can only best be achieved by grappling with geopolitical challenges with exercise 0f 'Hard Power' in strategic coalitions with Major Powers with which strategic convergences exist on threats to Indian security.

Concluding, in the transient phase of India graduating to grapple with geopolitical challenges based more on 'realpolitik' than idealism, it is recommended that India follow France in terms of the dominant foreign policy precept, namely, "Allied but Not Aligned" so asserted by French President Macron. This should satisfy the present proponents of the current foreign policy postulations.

RUSSIA-IRAN-CHINA TRILATERAL 2024: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

The Russia-Iran-China (RIC) Trilateral has acquired sharper strategic contours in 2024 in the wake of ongoing war in Ukraine and the Gaza War. 

In the Ukraine War ongoing since February 2023 by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Russia stands stalemated by Ukraine military resistance beefed - up by NATO and United States military supplies.

The Israel-Hamas War in Gaza provoked by Hamas massacre attack on Israeli civilians ongoing since October 2023, the Hamas Islamist Militia despite devastation in Gaza by Israeli offensives is offering stiff resistance beefed by military hardware and rockets ostensibly supplied by Iran.

Analytically, what is in play in both these wars is that they have emerged as proxy wars between United States and Russia with China and Iran in tow.

Reality check of the proxy wars with global implications, on joining the geopolitical and strategic dots, reveal that the RIC Trilateral is comprehensively involved on side of Russia in the Ukraine War. 

China has secretly given military aid to Russia for its war in Ukraine and Iran has supplied Russia with hundreds of deadly armed drones.

In the Gaza War, while direct military involvement of Russia and China is not visible but what stands out is that Iran would not have dared to encourage its proxy armed militias in the Middle East---Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in South Yemen to take on the might of Israel and United States but for unstinted geopolitical support by Russia and China to Iran and a call on their countervailing power should United States strike Iran.

Deciphering the strategic equations within RIC Trilateral what emerges is that Russia and China are in virtual military alliance, Iran has a long-standing strategic relationship with Russia, and China has induced Iran into a 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Russia, Iran and China in 2024 are individually and collectively seen as 'States Adversarial to United States'. Russia and China are global nuclear weapons and military Powers and Iran is the predominant Regional Power in the Middle East with a nascent nuclear weapons arsenal.

Geostrategically, the RIC Trilateral has Russia and China encompassing the vast Eurasian Heartland and Iran dominating the Middle East with the entire Eastern Littoral of The Gulf lying within Iran.

Overall, the RIC Trilateral with more security cohesiveness emerges as a "formidable" geopolitical and geostrategic entity.

Policy implications for India arising from the RIC Trilateral in 2024 need to be contextually viewed in light of India's existing relationships with these three Powers,

India has a long -standing strategic relationship with Russia but the original sheen has worn off due to India's growing strategic proximity with United States.

China and India are in a state of intense and explosive military confrontation. Deep strategic distrust pervades the relations.

India and Iran have enjoyed good relations and even a strategic partnership agreement exists.

Looking at short-term and even middle-term perspectives no optimistic indicators can be foreseen of any normalization of relations between the RIC Trilateral and the United States.

On the contrary, one can visualize and expect those unfolding geopolitical developments in Europe, Middle East and IndoPacific could only widen the confrontation chasm between RIC Trilateral and United States and its Allies and strategic partners.

In the above scenario, challenging policy implications arise for the Indian foreign policy establishment.

Russia debilitated by Ukraine War is being reduced to 'Team B' status in the Russia-China military alliance. Iran will circumstantially be forced to move into a closer strategic embrace of China.

With the above dynamics predominating, nether Russia nor Iran will have the policy bandwidth to have their erstwhile good working relationships with India, independent of the 'China Factor' dominating the RIC Trilateral.

Would India still continue with its foreign policy obsession of multi-dimensional or multipolar? 

What would be India's stance should Russia go to war with United States and NATO? President Putin on his recent re-election for another six-year term has warned of a Nuclear World War III. China has asserted that should NATO attack Russia, China will aid Russia.

In the above context, on behalf of RIC Trilateral, Iran can be assessed to open a third front in the Gulf and Middle East aided by its proxy militias already in action.

  In the above scenario, would India stand aside and profess neutrality when a catastrophic World War engulfs the entire globe.

Prudence would demand that India reset its foreign policy postulations with regard to Russia and Iran and the potential of these two Powers growing more subservient to China's interests which clash with India's security interest.

 

 

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CHINA REVERSES ITS PREFERENCE IN UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2024

China's foreign policies and strategic formulations in pursuit of President Xi Jinping's 'Great China Dream' are largely determined by the 'China Policy' formulations of the incumbent US President in the White House in Washinton DC.

In the last US Elections in 2020 in which former President Trump (R) sought re-election for a second term against present incumbent President Biden (D), China had gone all-out against re-election of President Trump.

 China's campaign in United States ranged from a mix of hybrid warfare, influence operations and peddling false narratives against President Trump. Soe quarters also suspiciously viewed China having a hand in racial riots at that time.

China's hatred for President Trump was fueled by President Trump's 'Hard Line' policies on China and being the first US President to launch substantial 'Trade War' against China and technology restrictions.

Coincidently, President Trump also tightened US policy screws on Pakistan--- the only 'Natural Ally' of China.

China consequently opted for President Biden as its 'preferred' choice of the next US President in 2020.China was further impelled by the fact that Biden a s US Vice President had established good personal relationship with Xi Jinping by a number of interactions.

China succeeded in President Biden as its preferred choice in White House, but China had not bargained with President Biden's changed perspectives on China determined both by geopolitical circumstances and domestic sentiment within United States.

Within a year in office, President Biden embarked on even stiffer 'Hard Line 'policies on China with wide technology restrictions. President Biden also reinforced the US-led security template in the Western Pacific, reinvigorating QUAD and forging a new nuclear-coalition of UKUS. Needlessly to say that all of these were targeting China.

The above factors can be offered as major reason for China 'reversing' its preferences in the forthcoming US Presidential Elections in end-2024.

China, it is widely believed, now wishes to see President Biden's back and wishes and may indulge in influence-operations towards former President Trump being elected as President at the end of this year.

Concluding, it needs to be highlighted that in China's policy perspectives the choice lies in 'Opting for the Lesser of Two Devils' as China consistently demonizes all US Presidents for impeding the rise of 'Great China'.

 

CHINA'S STRATEGIC DILEMMAS ON MILITARY INVASION OF TAIWAN -PERSPECTIVES 2024

China's military invasion of Taiwan for forcible re-unification with Communist Mainland China been viewed by strategic analysts as 'inevitable' moreso after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Admittedly, China has the intentions and the military capabilities which it has been building-up for more than a decade now. China however so far has not translated its intentions into reality. China has indulged into saber-rattling and brinkmanship to coerce Taiwan into submission.

China has visibly stopped short of an outright military invasion of Taiwan reflecting China's "Strategic Dilemmas" holding it back.

China's dilemmas range from global geopolitical reaction, US likely intervention, economic costs to China, Taiwan's formidable terrain configuration, and Tiwan's will to resist a Chinese military invasion with full- fledged offensive defense preparations.

Global geopolitical reactions will be heavily weighted against China, especially in the heavily polarized IndoPacific. China could ignore this at its peril.

United States likely military intervention in event of China's military invasion of Taiwan is a virtual certainty, irrespective of political dispensation in power in Washington. Unlike Ukraine, the United States has vital security stakes in Taiwan continuing as a linchpin in US First Line of Defense in Western Pacific.

China's economy is already sluggish and the costs of a military invasion of Taiwan, economic sanctions on China that will accrue thereafter, and considerable devastation that China could itself suffer, are serious imponderables which cannot be easily surmountable by China.

China could inflict massive destruction on Taiwan. by use of its ballistic missiles and use of air-power. But, for military invasion and occupation of Taiwan, a massive Chinese military amphibious operation would be required across the wide Taiwan Straits. 

A Chinese military amphibious operation would have to run the gauntlet of a mix of potent Taiwanese missiles and air-power counterstrikes, and military counterstrikes of possible US military intervention.

Added to the above is the force-multiplier effect of Taiwan's rugged rocky coastline abounding with multiple layers of obstacles designed to impede Chinese amphibious operations against Taiwan. 

Taiwan's will to resist Chinas' overlordship is best manifested by continued voting into power of Taiwanese Presidents opposed to China.

Perspectival analysis of China's strategic dilemmas in 2024 indicate that China will not attempt an outright military invasion of Taiwan in the near future. China's strategic readings of the major dilemmas sketched above would impede China from a hasty and impulsive invasion of Taiwan.

Concluding, one would however observe that like Russia's ill-fated invasion of Ukraine, similarly, Communist "Chinese 21st Century Emperor" President Xi Jinping could be tempted for doing so impelled by a misreading of United States resolve in defending Taiwan.

 

CHINA'IS INTENTIONS IN UNPRECEDENTED EXTOLLING OF EMERGENCE OF INDIA AS A MAJOR POWER UNDER PM MODI

 China's State organ in an unprecedented step extolled India's emergence as a 'Major Power' under the leadership of PM Narendra Modi. This has sent global geopolitical analysts in a tizzy as to what are China's underlying intentions behind such an assertion?

Only two deductions can be drawn from China's unsolicited assertion of conceding that India has emerged as a 'Major Power' under the leadership of PM Narendra Modi 2014-24. 

Taking at face value, it can be surmised that China's intentions are "pious" and that China may be interested in resetting China-India bitterly adversarial relations stemming from six decades of unresolved boundary disputes and massive armed confrontation on the Himalayan Borders with China Occupied Tibet.

At the other end of the spectrum when the China-India contentious and adversarial relationship is contextualized against China's policy of impeding India's rise as a Major Power, then doubts emerge on China's intentions.

Chinas in view of historical pattern of adversarial relations with India leads one to conclude that China's intentions may be devious and divisive.

India's emergence as a Major Power with substantive geopolitical weightage has been made possible by India's diplomatic drives under PM Modi and casting India's tilt towards the United States, the West and Amirian allies in Indo Pacific.

Contrary to India's official assertions that India is adopting Multilateralism as a foreign policy precept, the reality is that India is markedly with the United States and the West, despite occasional irritants in US-India relations.

The above strategic equations and India's expanding presence in the IndoPacific has weighted the 'Balance of Power' in Western Pacific and Southern Pacific against China. 

In the above scenario, China has only two options, namely to cut down India to size by a major conflict on the China-India Borders or secondly, to temporize with India by "Driving a Wedge" between United States and India.

The first option of a major China-India War is unlikely as China would have deciphered after 2020  Galwan Clashes and massive buildup in Ladakh that India under PM Modi is no longer a 'military pushover'. Further, that India has drastically reduced its military asymmetries with China both in terms of force deployments and border infrastructure.

China's second option therefore comes into play and that is to "Drive a Wedge" in US-India Strategic Partnership, which is a low-cost option.

China to drive a wedge in US-India relations can be assessed to operate on two different planes----one on the global geopolitical stage and the other on Inda's own domestic political situation.

The global geopolitical stage offers China many avenues to subtly discomfit India and sow doubts in Indian leadership on the "Value" of India's strategic partnership with the United States.

Briefly, the range of China's attempts could incorporate the reinvigoration of the Russia-India-China Trilateral and pressing the US for a US -China Dyad (Obama vintage) to manage Indo Pacific security which would then raise doubts in minds of Indian policy planners on United States future directions vis-a-vis China and India. 

In India's domestic politics, which are divisive and in which the Opposition is more Leftist inclined, China could use Disinformation Warfare follow a two-pronged strategy.

 China could keep extolling India's emergence as a Major Power but subtly inject in Indian political discourse that PM Modi has achieved it at a political price wherein India's own interests are subjugated to United States larger interest.

India's Opposition would be overready to lap -up the Chinese line and blow it out of proportion for political mileage against PM Modi. 

As it is there exists an intriguing convergence of China, Pakistan & India's major Opposition parties for a 'regime-change' of Modi Government.

Could there be a Russia-China connection in this geopolitical game? This question emerges because only a few weeks earlier, Russian President Putin was also heaping praise on India and PM Modi's leadership.

Concluding, it needs to be highlighted that if China's aim is divisive to "Drive a Wedge" in US-India Strategic Partnership, then China has a steep uphill task, simply, because a vast majority of Indians 'See more value' in India's partnership with the United States than China.

China at all levels in India suffers heavily from a "Strategic Trust Deficit" which requires China to concede substantive concessions to India after decades of unremitting aggression and military confrontation.