Russian President Putin in the APEC Meet at Vladivostok in September 2012 had indicated Russia's intention for a 'Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' presumably as a response to US President Obama's decision of United States earlier declaration of a 'Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific'.
The United States declaration incorporated the American response to the growing Chinese military aggressiveness in the region and more pointedly in the South China Sea where China then perceived that United States' power was on decline and therefore openings were presented to China to dent United States image as the Nett provider of regional security in the Asia Pacific.
Analysed by me then was that Russian President Putin's indication could be a potential strategic game-changer even though the Russian President had not spelt out any military blueprint like the United States assertion that it was 'Rebalancing US Forces in Asia Pacific".
Even if the Russian President's assertion was political signalling it was a welcome signal that a resurgent Russia desired to be politically and economically integrated in Aria Pacific, especially to lure Japanese investments in Russia's Pacific littoral and Siberia.
The Russian President's assertion was promising in that it was the first indication of Russia moving out of China's shadows to which President Yeltsin had consigned Russia to in earlier years.
Subsequently, however, follow-up Russian moves indicated that the 'China Factor' had come into play to decisively abort any genuine desires for a 'Russian Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' or even the initiation of an independent Russian line in Asia Pacific. Russia had obviously buckled under China's pressures.
Geopolitical readings of those years would indicate that Russia could not ignore China's sensitivities on any enhanced Russian profile in the Asia Pacific which could dwarf China's growing signature and footprints in the then Asia Pacific and China's yearnings to be geopolitically be considered as United States equal.
Russia for last two decades has been deferring to China despite Russia's resurgence under President Putin for two main reasons--namely, China's billion dollars purchases of Russian armaments and oil and gas; and secondly, because the 'Cold War Gladiators' on Capitol Hill in Washington had failed to recognise that the 'China Threat' to the United States was a more challenging and deadlier one than the 'Russian Threat' to United States.
For them Russia was the perennial enemy of the United States and China was amenable to be absorbed as a responsible stakeholder in Asia Pacific security.
The converse was more truer in the perceptions prevailing in Asian capitals then and now.
In 2020, what is visible is that because of the latter factor of the United States of giving primacy to China over Russia in its Asia Pacific policy formulations Russia stood pushed into China's strategic camp.
In terms of balance of power in the enlarged Indo Pacific today the visible picture is that the China-Russia Strategic Nexus has concretised as a powerful existential counterweight to the US-led Quadrilateral comprising United States, Japan, India and Australia.
However, as an analyst and keeping the history of China-Russia transactional relations, and their contentious differences and misgivings between these two mighty neighbours, I have reservations that in the event of a United States-China military conflict whether Russia would actively join hostilities against the United States.
Retrospectively, even if Russia seriously pursued its original intention of a credible 'Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' would Russia contextually have delinked itself from China to pursue a Russia-Centric Asia Pacific Pivot? The answer emerges as negative till such time China provoked an armed conflict with the United States.
Geopolitics also makes 'strange bedfellows' and the China-Russia relationship is certainly one notable one.
Peering into the future, one can advance the assessment that Russia would no more be tempted to a Russian 'Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' and rather prefer to watch amusingly as China keeps increasingly stepping into the minefield of a provocative armed conflict against the United States.
In the scenario above, no guesses need to be made as to who will be the ultimate winner.
The United States declaration incorporated the American response to the growing Chinese military aggressiveness in the region and more pointedly in the South China Sea where China then perceived that United States' power was on decline and therefore openings were presented to China to dent United States image as the Nett provider of regional security in the Asia Pacific.
Analysed by me then was that Russian President Putin's indication could be a potential strategic game-changer even though the Russian President had not spelt out any military blueprint like the United States assertion that it was 'Rebalancing US Forces in Asia Pacific".
Even if the Russian President's assertion was political signalling it was a welcome signal that a resurgent Russia desired to be politically and economically integrated in Aria Pacific, especially to lure Japanese investments in Russia's Pacific littoral and Siberia.
The Russian President's assertion was promising in that it was the first indication of Russia moving out of China's shadows to which President Yeltsin had consigned Russia to in earlier years.
Subsequently, however, follow-up Russian moves indicated that the 'China Factor' had come into play to decisively abort any genuine desires for a 'Russian Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' or even the initiation of an independent Russian line in Asia Pacific. Russia had obviously buckled under China's pressures.
Geopolitical readings of those years would indicate that Russia could not ignore China's sensitivities on any enhanced Russian profile in the Asia Pacific which could dwarf China's growing signature and footprints in the then Asia Pacific and China's yearnings to be geopolitically be considered as United States equal.
Russia for last two decades has been deferring to China despite Russia's resurgence under President Putin for two main reasons--namely, China's billion dollars purchases of Russian armaments and oil and gas; and secondly, because the 'Cold War Gladiators' on Capitol Hill in Washington had failed to recognise that the 'China Threat' to the United States was a more challenging and deadlier one than the 'Russian Threat' to United States.
For them Russia was the perennial enemy of the United States and China was amenable to be absorbed as a responsible stakeholder in Asia Pacific security.
The converse was more truer in the perceptions prevailing in Asian capitals then and now.
In 2020, what is visible is that because of the latter factor of the United States of giving primacy to China over Russia in its Asia Pacific policy formulations Russia stood pushed into China's strategic camp.
In terms of balance of power in the enlarged Indo Pacific today the visible picture is that the China-Russia Strategic Nexus has concretised as a powerful existential counterweight to the US-led Quadrilateral comprising United States, Japan, India and Australia.
However, as an analyst and keeping the history of China-Russia transactional relations, and their contentious differences and misgivings between these two mighty neighbours, I have reservations that in the event of a United States-China military conflict whether Russia would actively join hostilities against the United States.
Retrospectively, even if Russia seriously pursued its original intention of a credible 'Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' would Russia contextually have delinked itself from China to pursue a Russia-Centric Asia Pacific Pivot? The answer emerges as negative till such time China provoked an armed conflict with the United States.
Geopolitics also makes 'strange bedfellows' and the China-Russia relationship is certainly one notable one.
Peering into the future, one can advance the assessment that Russia would no more be tempted to a Russian 'Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' and rather prefer to watch amusingly as China keeps increasingly stepping into the minefield of a provocative armed conflict against the United States.
In the scenario above, no guesses need to be made as to who will be the ultimate winner.
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