'QUAD' SECURITY DIALOGUE: IMPERATIVES TO MOVE FROM DIALOGUES TO EXPLICIT 'CHINA THREAT' DETERRENCE STRATEGIES

 The QUAD was originally conceptualized in 2007 by then Japanese PM Shinzo Abe as an existential 'Arc of Democracies' for political signaling against the growing China Threat in Indo Pacific.

Within a year or two QUAD as a political construct to checkmate China lost steam primarily due to United States 'China Hedging' Policies and then Indian Government's similar inclinations of being timid on China.

QUAD was effectively resurrected in 2017 with advent of US Republican President Trump in White House who initiated effective 'Hard Line' China-policy. Similarly, the advent of PM Narendra Modi in India as Prime Minister provided some more impetus to make QUAD a meaningful construct.

President Biden who succeeded President Trump had kept up prioritizing QUAD till lately with diplomatic meets at Foreign Ministers level and annual QUAD Summits.

QUAD however in its roles has continued so far without the necessary military trappings which could checkmate China. China consequently has stood emboldened to merrily continue with its 'Disruptive Strategies' impacting Indo Pacific security and stability.

In an overall analysis, what starkly emerges in 2024 is that while the China Threat to IndoPacific security has "intensified" QUAD as an existential checkmate to China's expanding aggressiveness has reduced itself to more of a "Humanitarian Disaster Relief Organization".

QUAD Summits have repeatedly called for a "Free and Open Indo Pacific". Free and Open IndoPacific cannot be achieved without being "EXPLICIT" as to which Nation is threatening IndoPacific security and stability.

Both leading Powers of QUAD, namely, the United States and India have shied away from naming China Threat impacting IndoPacific security.

Observing United States and India's diffidence in explicitly designating the China Threat and China's efforts to drive wedges in QUAD's cohesion has emboldened China in conducting more aggressive military forays on its peripheries extending from India to Western Pacific and South Pacific.

China Threat cannot be checkmated by diplomatic dialogues or meaningless assertions that QUAD is not aimed at any nation.

China can be checkmated only by first a clear and unambiguous statement of 'Intent' by QUAD that this coalition is a 'strategic organization' to checkmate China's predatory prowling in Indo Pacific.

Statement of Intent by QUAD should as a follow-up have discussions on creating integrated security mechanisms to checkmate China's maritime aggression in the South China Sea expanse.

Concurrently, QUAD Nations should plan to expand the military capacity and capability of Western Pacific Nations presently under China's political and military coercion, namely, Taiwan and the Philippines

Military inter-operability amongst QUAD Nations must be a top priority spanning full-spectrum military domains enabling an effective combined military response in any crisis generated or provoke by China.

Concluding, it needs to be highlighted, that QUAD even in its present nebulous loose state of neither being a well-knit geopolitical coalition or a 'security coalition' continues to rattle China which is concerned that QUAD is targeting China.

China when faced with a security-centric contours predominant QUAD with a clear statement of intent can be hoped t0 emerge as a 'powerful deterrent' against China's predatory aggression in IndoPacific. China would then be faced with prospects that any Chinese aggression in Indo Pacific would incur heavy costs to China by QUAD's integrated robust responses.

INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY DOMINANT PRECEPT IN POLARIZED WORLD 2024 SHOULD BE -"ALLIED BUT NOT ALIGNED"

India's foreign policy cannot operate in a vacuum divorced from global and regional geopolitical environment. The global regional environment is heavily polarized in 2024 between United States & Allies and the two Communist States, Russia and China.

The Indo Pacific geopolitical environment of which India is a pivotal nation reflects the global polarization even more intensely due to Communist China's predatory aggressiveness against all its peripheral neighbors. chiefly, India.

Perceptionaly, India's pattern of strategic partnerships and engagement present an indisputable picture of India being a 'Natural Ally' of the United States and West.

The above is indisputable especially in the case of India's highly institutionalized security mechanisms with the United States which have evolved over two decades. While both United States and India shy away from terming it as China Threat-centric but the reality is that it is so.

In this heavily polarized geopolitical environment, more sharper after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2023 and China consequently raising its military provocations against Taiwan, the confrontations both in Europe and in India Pacific have intensified. 

India's continued 'Strategic Partnership' with Russia is a hangover relict of the heyday of India's Non-Alignment era. This relationship has multiple contradictions when viewed against contextual geopolitical global and regional environment.

Russia is in a 'Military Alliance 'with China but for the name. China figures topmost in India's threat perceptions. Russia is therefore ill-placed to act as India's 'Countervailing Power' against Chinese aggression because of Russia's heavy reliance on China linkages.

Russia also has not displayed any inclination to prevail over China to desist from hostile activities in South Asia inimical to Indian security interests.

Russia's only utility to Indian foreign policy interests is as a source of cheap oil supplies and which utility can be assessed as transactional in nature. With India's reduced reliance on Russian armaments the Russia-India relationship can be at best viewed overall as transactional.

Consequently, the crucial and pertinent question that India's foreign policy planners are posed with is what imperatives exist for India's obsession with a 'multipolar world order' or 'multilateralism' as a foreign policy precept.

Will these two Indian foreign policy precepts be adequate to serve India's national security interests in a heavily polarized geopolitical environment?

What these two foreign policy precepts generate in global geopolitical dynamics is ambiguity on India's strategic directions and postures. 'Strategic Ambiguity' has cost India heavily in the past both strategically and economically.

Should India go down again on that path of Indian foreign policy postulations? 

India in last ten years has projected to the world that it intends to play the role of a Major Power in global affairs. Such a national aspiration cannot be achieved nor sustained by multipolarity or multilateralism.

The above Indian 'National Aspiration' can only best be achieved by grappling with geopolitical challenges with exercise 0f 'Hard Power' in strategic coalitions with Major Powers with which strategic convergences exist on threats to Indian security.

Concluding, in the transient phase of India graduating to grapple with geopolitical challenges based more on 'realpolitik' than idealism, it is recommended that India follow France in terms of the dominant foreign policy precept, namely, "Allied but Not Aligned" so asserted by French President Macron. This should satisfy the present proponents of the current foreign policy postulations.

RUSSIA-IRAN-CHINA TRILATERAL 2024: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

The Russia-Iran-China (RIC) Trilateral has acquired sharper strategic contours in 2024 in the wake of ongoing war in Ukraine and the Gaza War. 

In the Ukraine War ongoing since February 2023 by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Russia stands stalemated by Ukraine military resistance beefed - up by NATO and United States military supplies.

The Israel-Hamas War in Gaza provoked by Hamas massacre attack on Israeli civilians ongoing since October 2023, the Hamas Islamist Militia despite devastation in Gaza by Israeli offensives is offering stiff resistance beefed by military hardware and rockets ostensibly supplied by Iran.

Analytically, what is in play in both these wars is that they have emerged as proxy wars between United States and Russia with China and Iran in tow.

Reality check of the proxy wars with global implications, on joining the geopolitical and strategic dots, reveal that the RIC Trilateral is comprehensively involved on side of Russia in the Ukraine War. 

China has secretly given military aid to Russia for its war in Ukraine and Iran has supplied Russia with hundreds of deadly armed drones.

In the Gaza War, while direct military involvement of Russia and China is not visible but what stands out is that Iran would not have dared to encourage its proxy armed militias in the Middle East---Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in South Yemen to take on the might of Israel and United States but for unstinted geopolitical support by Russia and China to Iran and a call on their countervailing power should United States strike Iran.

Deciphering the strategic equations within RIC Trilateral what emerges is that Russia and China are in virtual military alliance, Iran has a long-standing strategic relationship with Russia, and China has induced Iran into a 25-Year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Russia, Iran and China in 2024 are individually and collectively seen as 'States Adversarial to United States'. Russia and China are global nuclear weapons and military Powers and Iran is the predominant Regional Power in the Middle East with a nascent nuclear weapons arsenal.

Geostrategically, the RIC Trilateral has Russia and China encompassing the vast Eurasian Heartland and Iran dominating the Middle East with the entire Eastern Littoral of The Gulf lying within Iran.

Overall, the RIC Trilateral with more security cohesiveness emerges as a "formidable" geopolitical and geostrategic entity.

Policy implications for India arising from the RIC Trilateral in 2024 need to be contextually viewed in light of India's existing relationships with these three Powers,

India has a long -standing strategic relationship with Russia but the original sheen has worn off due to India's growing strategic proximity with United States.

China and India are in a state of intense and explosive military confrontation. Deep strategic distrust pervades the relations.

India and Iran have enjoyed good relations and even a strategic partnership agreement exists.

Looking at short-term and even middle-term perspectives no optimistic indicators can be foreseen of any normalization of relations between the RIC Trilateral and the United States.

On the contrary, one can visualize and expect those unfolding geopolitical developments in Europe, Middle East and IndoPacific could only widen the confrontation chasm between RIC Trilateral and United States and its Allies and strategic partners.

In the above scenario, challenging policy implications arise for the Indian foreign policy establishment.

Russia debilitated by Ukraine War is being reduced to 'Team B' status in the Russia-China military alliance. Iran will circumstantially be forced to move into a closer strategic embrace of China.

With the above dynamics predominating, nether Russia nor Iran will have the policy bandwidth to have their erstwhile good working relationships with India, independent of the 'China Factor' dominating the RIC Trilateral.

Would India still continue with its foreign policy obsession of multi-dimensional or multipolar? 

What would be India's stance should Russia go to war with United States and NATO? President Putin on his recent re-election for another six-year term has warned of a Nuclear World War III. China has asserted that should NATO attack Russia, China will aid Russia.

In the above context, on behalf of RIC Trilateral, Iran can be assessed to open a third front in the Gulf and Middle East aided by its proxy militias already in action.

  In the above scenario, would India stand aside and profess neutrality when a catastrophic World War engulfs the entire globe.

Prudence would demand that India reset its foreign policy postulations with regard to Russia and Iran and the potential of these two Powers growing more subservient to China's interests which clash with India's security interest.

 

 

d

 

CHINA REVERSES ITS PREFERENCE IN UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2024

China's foreign policies and strategic formulations in pursuit of President Xi Jinping's 'Great China Dream' are largely determined by the 'China Policy' formulations of the incumbent US President in the White House in Washinton DC.

In the last US Elections in 2020 in which former President Trump (R) sought re-election for a second term against present incumbent President Biden (D), China had gone all-out against re-election of President Trump.

 China's campaign in United States ranged from a mix of hybrid warfare, influence operations and peddling false narratives against President Trump. Soe quarters also suspiciously viewed China having a hand in racial riots at that time.

China's hatred for President Trump was fueled by President Trump's 'Hard Line' policies on China and being the first US President to launch substantial 'Trade War' against China and technology restrictions.

Coincidently, President Trump also tightened US policy screws on Pakistan--- the only 'Natural Ally' of China.

China consequently opted for President Biden as its 'preferred' choice of the next US President in 2020.China was further impelled by the fact that Biden a s US Vice President had established good personal relationship with Xi Jinping by a number of interactions.

China succeeded in President Biden as its preferred choice in White House, but China had not bargained with President Biden's changed perspectives on China determined both by geopolitical circumstances and domestic sentiment within United States.

Within a year in office, President Biden embarked on even stiffer 'Hard Line 'policies on China with wide technology restrictions. President Biden also reinforced the US-led security template in the Western Pacific, reinvigorating QUAD and forging a new nuclear-coalition of UKUS. Needlessly to say that all of these were targeting China.

The above factors can be offered as major reason for China 'reversing' its preferences in the forthcoming US Presidential Elections in end-2024.

China, it is widely believed, now wishes to see President Biden's back and wishes and may indulge in influence-operations towards former President Trump being elected as President at the end of this year.

Concluding, it needs to be highlighted that in China's policy perspectives the choice lies in 'Opting for the Lesser of Two Devils' as China consistently demonizes all US Presidents for impeding the rise of 'Great China'.

 

CHINA'S STRATEGIC DILEMMAS ON MILITARY INVASION OF TAIWAN -PERSPECTIVES 2024

China's military invasion of Taiwan for forcible re-unification with Communist Mainland China been viewed by strategic analysts as 'inevitable' moreso after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Admittedly, China has the intentions and the military capabilities which it has been building-up for more than a decade now. China however so far has not translated its intentions into reality. China has indulged into saber-rattling and brinkmanship to coerce Taiwan into submission.

China has visibly stopped short of an outright military invasion of Taiwan reflecting China's "Strategic Dilemmas" holding it back.

China's dilemmas range from global geopolitical reaction, US likely intervention, economic costs to China, Taiwan's formidable terrain configuration, and Tiwan's will to resist a Chinese military invasion with full- fledged offensive defense preparations.

Global geopolitical reactions will be heavily weighted against China, especially in the heavily polarized IndoPacific. China could ignore this at its peril.

United States likely military intervention in event of China's military invasion of Taiwan is a virtual certainty, irrespective of political dispensation in power in Washington. Unlike Ukraine, the United States has vital security stakes in Taiwan continuing as a linchpin in US First Line of Defense in Western Pacific.

China's economy is already sluggish and the costs of a military invasion of Taiwan, economic sanctions on China that will accrue thereafter, and considerable devastation that China could itself suffer, are serious imponderables which cannot be easily surmountable by China.

China could inflict massive destruction on Taiwan. by use of its ballistic missiles and use of air-power. But, for military invasion and occupation of Taiwan, a massive Chinese military amphibious operation would be required across the wide Taiwan Straits. 

A Chinese military amphibious operation would have to run the gauntlet of a mix of potent Taiwanese missiles and air-power counterstrikes, and military counterstrikes of possible US military intervention.

Added to the above is the force-multiplier effect of Taiwan's rugged rocky coastline abounding with multiple layers of obstacles designed to impede Chinese amphibious operations against Taiwan. 

Taiwan's will to resist Chinas' overlordship is best manifested by continued voting into power of Taiwanese Presidents opposed to China.

Perspectival analysis of China's strategic dilemmas in 2024 indicate that China will not attempt an outright military invasion of Taiwan in the near future. China's strategic readings of the major dilemmas sketched above would impede China from a hasty and impulsive invasion of Taiwan.

Concluding, one would however observe that like Russia's ill-fated invasion of Ukraine, similarly, Communist "Chinese 21st Century Emperor" President Xi Jinping could be tempted for doing so impelled by a misreading of United States resolve in defending Taiwan.