Sunday, July 11, 2021

GERMANY'S IMPERATIVES FOR SYMBOLIC NAVAL PRESENCE IN SOUTH CHINA SEA AGAINST CHINA

Germany noticeably seems to have abstained from marking its naval presence in South China Sea unlike the French Navy and British Navy. France and Great Britain had recently sent Aircraft Carrier Group/ Amphibious Warships to South China Sea. 

This was an expression of solidarity with other Major Powers' Navies led by United States challenging China's military adventurism in reinforcing its illegal sovereignty over the South China Sea maritime expanse.

Geopolitically, can Germany afford to stand aside from the global effort to signal China that it cannot recklessly continue to disreagard international conventions like UNCLOS and The Hague TribunalAward which ruled against China's claims of sovereignty over South China Sea?

Can Germany afford to break ranks with NATO and the European Union's revised perspectives on China evolving as a 'Threat to European Stability' in the coming decade?

Germany may have got away with its 'China Hands-off Policy' of past decades. But in the rapidly churning geopolitical global landscape, Germany will have to take a stand against China.

China has brought on itself the spectre of intense global geopolitical polarisation against China by its reckless aggression extending from India's Eastern Ladakh to South China Sea and forcible military occupation of Islands belonging to Vietnam and Philippines,

Germany in 2021 has to seriously and crucially weigh whether it can still persist to stand aside unlike Major Powers like France, Great Britain, India, Japan and Australia which are coalescing together to ensure 'Freedom of Naviagtion' in South China Sea and the Airspace over it.

Even Canada has recently exercised with other Navies in South China Sea.

Therefore, in terms of Trans-Atlantic Alliance and in terms of European Major Powers solidarity , it is incumbent on Germany to mark German Navy presence in South China Sea without further dithering. 

Germany may also addittionally like to deliberate on whether it can bear the 'perceptional costs' of loss of image in Asian Capitals by inadvertently getting type-casted as permissive of China's military aggression in South China Sea.










 

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