RUSSIA'S ABORTED STRATEGIC PIVOT TO ASIA PACIFIC- THE CHINA FACTOR

Russian President Putin in the APEC Meet at Vladivostok in September 2012 had indicated Russia's intention for a 'Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' presumably as a response to US President Obama's decision of United States earlier declaration of a 'Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific'.

The United States declaration incorporated the American response to the growing Chinese military aggressiveness in the region and more pointedly in the South China Sea where China then perceived that United States' power was on decline and therefore openings were presented to China to dent United States image as the Nett provider of regional security in the Asia Pacific. 

Analysed by me then was that Russian President Putin's indication could be a potential strategic game-changer even though the Russian President had not spelt out any military blueprint like the United States assertion that it was 'Rebalancing US Forces in Asia Pacific".

Even if the Russian President's assertion was political signalling it was a welcome signal that a resurgent Russia desired to be politically and economically integrated in Aria Pacific, especially to lure Japanese investments in Russia's Pacific littoral and Siberia.

The Russian President's assertion was promising in that it was the first indication of Russia moving out of China's shadows to which President Yeltsin had consigned Russia to in earlier years.

Subsequently, however, follow-up Russian moves indicated that the 'China Factor' had come into play to decisively abort any genuine desires for a 'Russian Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' or even the initiation of an independent Russian line in Asia Pacific. Russia had obviously buckled under China's pressures.

Geopolitical readings of those years would indicate that Russia could not ignore China's sensitivities on any enhanced Russian profile in the Asia Pacific which could dwarf China's growing signature and footprints in the then Asia Pacific and China's yearnings to be geopolitically be considered as United States equal.

Russia for last two decades has been deferring to China despite Russia's resurgence under President Putin for two main reasons--namely, China's billion dollars purchases of Russian armaments and oil and gas; and secondly, because the 'Cold War Gladiators' on Capitol Hill in Washington had failed to recognise that the 'China Threat' to the United States was a more challenging and deadlier one than the 'Russian Threat' to United States.

For them Russia was the perennial enemy of the United States and China was amenable to be absorbed as a responsible stakeholder in Asia Pacific security.

The converse was more truer in the perceptions prevailing in Asian capitals then and now.

In 2020, what is visible is that because of the latter factor of the United States of giving primacy to China over Russia in its Asia Pacific policy formulations Russia stood pushed into China's strategic camp.

In terms of balance of power in the enlarged Indo Pacific today the visible picture is that the China-Russia Strategic Nexus has concretised as a powerful existential counterweight to the US-led Quadrilateral comprising United States, Japan, India and Australia.

However, as an analyst and keeping the history of China-Russia transactional relations, and their contentious differences and misgivings between these two mighty neighbours, I have reservations that in the event of a United States-China military conflict whether Russia would actively join hostilities against the United States.

Retrospectively, even if Russia seriously pursued its original intention of a credible 'Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' would Russia contextually have delinked itself from China to pursue a Russia-Centric Asia Pacific Pivot?  The answer emerges as negative till such time China provoked an armed conflict with the United States.

Geopolitics also makes 'strange bedfellows' and the China-Russia relationship is certainly one notable one.

Peering into the future, one can advance the assessment that Russia would no more be tempted to a Russian 'Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific' and rather prefer to watch amusingly as China keeps increasingly stepping into the minefield of a provocative armed conflict against the United States.

In the scenario above, no guesses need to be made as to who will be the ultimate winner.



 

SOUTH EAST ASIA'S CRITICAL ROLE IN INDO PACIFIC SECURITY

South East Asia geostrategically located astride the South China Sea maritime expanse which provides the maritime linkage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans is destined to play a crucial role in Indo Pacific Security in the 21st Century.

From the middle of the first decade of the 21st Century with the exponential and threatening military rise of China, the South East Asian countries have been engaged in beefing up their Navies perceiving that the China Threat as manifested in the South China Sea aggressions earlier against Vietnam and the Philippines now also encompasses Malaysia and Indonesia and more could follow.

Besides this regional context, there is the global context where South East Asia comes into focus with its geostrategic location astride the South China Sea. 

This pertains to the 'China Challenge' to the United States which stoutly maintains that the waters of the South China Sea are "Global Commons" as an international waterway and thus cannot be under illegal sovereignty claim of China or China can be allowed to impede free and unrestricted navigation both by sea and the skies above the South China Sea.

The South China Sea in 2020 portends to be the theatre of possible armed conflict between China and the United States with the sabre-rattling that China has commenced on all its peripheries.

Contextually, the South East Asian countries cannot escape the realities that geography has endowed on this immensely geostrategically significant region.

The developing conflictual scenarios edging towards an armed conflict between the United Sates and China due to China's provocative moves would leave no political or strategic space to South East Asian countries to sit on the fence as passive spectators.

ASEAN as the regional political grouping which for decades sought to engage China in dialogues and discussions by inviting China to be participating in various ASEAN mechanisms needs to do some soul-searching in relation to its future linkages with China.

What is unmistakeably clear in 2020 is that China had a certain credibility as long as China professed and acted as per its 'Soft Power' strategies. With switchover to China's 'Hard Power' strategies ASEAN nations like Vietnam and the Philippines were claimed as China's first victims of aggression. Moves have now become visible of China to move against Malaysia and Indonesia.

ASEAN should also not forget the historical context of China covetous design and strategies against South East Asia and claim this crucial geostrategic region as China's backyard. The China-inspired Communist insurgencies in Burma and Malaya were the opening moves.

Various security groupings emerged in intervening decades like SEATO and FPDA. Besides these security mechanisms
 ASEAN played around with ZOPFAN as a nuclear free Zone of Peace, Freedom & Neutrality in South East Asia.

ASEAN was lulled into complacency in the last decade of the 20th Century by Chinese duplicitous diplomacy as a responsible stakeholder in South East Asian security. China's cards are now lying open on the cards table and it doses not augur well for South East Asia.

In the contextual developing scenario with marked conflictual overtones it is a strategic imperative both for South East Asian countries to individually and also as ASEAN as their regional grouping to join the dots of China's military intentions in the South China Sea and its impact on their security.

The overall Indo Pacific Security Template can be greatly strengthened if the above dawns on South East Asian countries and ASEAN.

The Major Nations of the Indo Pacific and even Europe are seriously seized with deterring China from its military aggression in South China Sea  and therefore can South East Asian countries now afford to be a divided region when Indo Pacific security of which they are a part, stands endangered by China flouting all norms of international laws and conventions.

The stark realty that South East Asian countries and ASEAN as their regional political grouping has to face is that geographical configurations in relation to the South China Sea and China's unfolding intentions therein leave no scope for "Neutrality" !!!





 

SOUTH CHINA SEA NEEDS JOINT NAVAL PATROLS BY ASEAN NATIONS

South China Sea has been rendered as an explosive flashpoint in the Indo Pacific more pointedly after the advent of President Xi Jinping to power in Beijing. Under his leadership China significantly switched to 'Hard Power' strategies of a combination of muscular diplomacy and outright military aggression as manifested by China establishing 'Full Spectrum Dominance' over the South China Sea vast maritime expanse.

The South China Sea certainly was not historically a China Inland Sea as now China intends to convert it into. The term South China Sea was more of a geographical expression by Western colonial powers denoting the maritime expanse fractionally lying along China's Southern coastline, but not exclusively confined to the Chinese coastline.

In fact, the South China Sea commencing from Taiwan runs all the way to the Straits of Malacca with ASEAN countries having littorals on it.

Authoritative sources define the South China Sea as: "Geographically, the South China Sea plays a significant role in the geopolitics of the Indo Pacific. The South China Sea is bordered by Brunei, Cambodia,  China, Indonesia,  Malaysia. the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam."

Further, the South China sea is an arm of the Western Pacific Ocean and this vast maritime expanse extending from South of Taiwan to the Straits of Malacca is geopolitically described as "Global Commons" as it is of critical importance not only to the ASEAN littoral countries but to all the Major Powers of the world for strategic and economic reasons.

China with a fractional littoral on South China Sea as compared to ASEAN countries has coveted the South China Sea for strategic reasons to deny United States 'Close-In Military Intervention' should hostilities erupt. China also covets the vast mineral wealth and energy resources in which this Sea abounds.

China also intends that with complete military dominance over the South China Sea it can prevent or impede the military switchover of US Navy Fleets from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and vice versa. China also intends that with such military dominance it can throttle the 'jugular vein' of staunch US Allies in the Western Pacific like Japan and South Korea.

China has illegally and by force has declared 'Full Sovereignty' over 90% of the South China Sea and established military control in recent years by capturing Vietnamese Islands and Philippines islets. It has also constructed fortified 'artificial islands in the South China Sea.

In 2020 China is in conflict with ASEAN nations like Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei---virtually the whole of ASEAN.

Against this contextual backdrop it becomes incumbent to ask as to why ASEAN as the notable regional grouping in South East Asia of long standing has not taken a united stand against Chinese aggression over the years against most of the ASEAN nations having vital stakes in the South China Sea?

The significant reason for this glaring omission was that China successfully created divides within ASEAN to prevent a 'United Stand' against China  by different inducements. Till recently major ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia were notable 'Fence-Sitters' in not taking strong positions against China.

In 2020 as China has stamped on the toes of Indonesia and Malaysia also in the South China Sea waters, possibilities now open for ASEAN Nations to adopt strong postures against China's creeping expansion of its footprints in the control of the South China Sea.

The first visible step of ASEAN Nations united resolve is to put into motion "Joint Naval Patrols" of ASEAN Navies in the South China Sea. China needs to be put on notice by ASEAN Nations that individual ASEAN countries are no longer purchasable by China to keep ASEAN divided.

Major Powers Navies are already frequenting the South China Sea by 'Joint Exercises' besides FONOPS by US Navy ships around disputed islands under illegal Chinese occupation and since fortified.

The South China Sea is inevitably headed for a global conflict as China has added too many incendiary overtones to its illegal occupation of ASEAN Nations islands. At some stage the Major Powers will be forced to lift China's illegal sovereignty claims and dominance impeding 'free and unimpeded maritime navigation in the South China Sea

In that eventuality, ASEAN Nations would not have the luxury to be passive spectators in a global conflict over the South China Sea. Strategic prudence dictates that ASEAN Nations "Stand-Up" to China and the best option contextually is to put into operation "Joint Naval Patrols" of ASEAN Navies in the South China Sea.

UNITED STATES TWO DIFFERING LEGACIES IN INDO PACIFIC-KISSINGER'S "CHINA MONSTER" AND GENERAL MACARTHUR'S "JAPAN AS ENDURING ALLY"

In mid-2020 as the world witnesses the United States waking up to the serious threat posed by China to Indo Pacific Security and China's bid to challenge US predominance as the reigning sole Superpower, two opposing images strike one's mind in terms of geopolitical and strategic legacy issues inherited by the United States from its 20th Century diplomatic history.

The immediate image and a disturbing one is that of the  "China Monster" created by the flawed China-centric foreign policy of US President Nixon in early 1970s goaded and manoeuvred by his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

In my assessment US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was mythicized as a great statesman imbued with retaining United States supremacy as the only Superpower. Perceptionally, Kissinger went overboard pursuing political expediency of balancing the Former USSR--then a opposing Superpower, by inducing China into a quasi-strategic ally of the United States.

How long did that last? By the 1980s the United States was having second thoughts on China as a strategic partner against the Former Soviet Union.

Kissinger's assessments of China and Pakistan which he used as an intermediary for openings to Communist China for normalisation of US-China relations in 1970 were deeply flawed.

Ironically today, China today has turned out as a 'Fire Spitting Dragon' engaged in undermining US national security interests all over the Indo Pacific and Pakistan as US Non- NATO Ally and recipient of billions of US dollars in aid has switched from being a 'Front Line State' of the United States to emerge in recent years as 'Front Line State of China' undermining US interests in Indo Pacific Western Segment. 

Obviously, Kissinger's geopolitical vision and formulations on China and Pakistan were grievously wrong in that within a span of 30 years or so both China and Pakistan have turned adversarial to the United States.

In marked contrast to Henry Kissinger's politically expedient legacy what shines out is General Douglas MacArthur's enduring legacy of Japan as an "Enduring Ally" of the United States which has steadfastly proven its Alliance commitments to US Security interests and to Indo Pacific Security for nearly 70 years plus.

In an act of far-sighted statesmanship General MacArthur transformed United States World War II vanquished Japan humbled into submission by two Atomic Bombings into the United States most enduring military ally with due respects and honours.

Japan has more than repaid General MacArthur's trust in Japan reposed on behalf of the United Sates. In 2020 the Indo Pacific Security Template led by the United States rests honourably on the shoulders of Japan as a great Asian Major Power. Japan is the pivot of US security interests.

China contrastingly having achieved exponential military and economic power courtesy 'Flawed China Policy' of Kissinger and follow-up United States policies of 'China Appeasement' and 'Risk Aversion Strategies' of US in relation to China has stabbed in the back the United States as its benefactor.

One wonders today as to why it took so long for US policy establishment to recognise that the 'China Threat' was evolving into United States most serious  security challenge. Presumably, US industrial giants lulled by Kissinger into massive US investments in China were looking more into their balance-sheets  than the 'China Threat ' -in-the-making because of US permissiveness.

The United States owes a great national debt of honour to General MacArthur.If the United States is firmly embedded in the Western Pacific even in 2020, the credit goes to General MacArthur far-sightedness Japan-policy post August 1945.

JAPAN 'S SIGNIFICANT ROLE AS MAJOR PLAYER IN INDO PACIFIC SECURITY

Japan with its geostrategic location in the Western Pacific virtually on the doorsteps of China and Russia,, (both conjoined presently in a 'Strategic Nexus')coupled with its technology advancements, self-reliant defence production and economic strengths stands uniquely placed as the linchpin of any security architecture in the Indo Pacific geopolitical expanse.

Japan's earlier significance as security pivot of the United States security architecture in Asia Pacific against the 'Soviet Union Threat' during the First Cold War now stands radically transformed to that of a crucial security pivot of the much wider Indo Pacific Security Template against the burgeoning 'China Threat' which in 2020 has all the dimensions of a Second Cold War 

Japan played a significant role in US security architecture for then Asia Pacific during the First Cold War hosting US Forward Military Presence against the then Soviet Union threat.

Japan continues to host a sizeable US Forward Military Presence during the Second Cold War whose advent I had pointed out in my writings in 2001 of China having generated the opening moves of the Second Cold War against the United States.

The 'China Threat' in 2020 is now palpably felt not only by United States and Japan but ASEAN nations like Philippines and Vietnam. Significantly, India as the other Major Asian Power has pronounced threat perceptions focus on China and the China-Pakistan Axis.

Notably therefore in 2020, strategic convergences on the 'Chia Threat' have crystallised between the United Sates, Japan and India and extending to Australia.

Thus we are witnessing presently a strategic coalescing of the Major Democracies of the Indo Pacific against the jointly perceived 'China Threat'.

Japan since the switchover by China of military strategies from 'Soft Power' to 'Hard Power' since 2008 and more muscularly with ascension of power in Beijing of President Xi Jinping has been giving a sustained attention to build up its defence capabilities including force projection.

China in recent years has consistently attempted political an military coercion against Japan by its aggressive brinkmanship around the Japanese Senkaku Islands and its submarines prowling in Inland Sea of Japan

Contextually, Japan today is thus uniquely placed to play a stellar role in Indo Pacific Security with its geopolitical and military experience of facing the 'Soviet Threat' during the First Cold War and in coping with the enlarging 'China Threat' for the last decade and a half.

China may have vast numbers on its side militarily but Japan off-sets this numerical advantage of China by hi-tech Japanese Armed Forces. In fact, I have always rated the Japanese Navy as one of the best Navies in the Indo Pacific after the US Navy.

While China may have established 'Full Spectrum Dominance' over the South China Sea and perceive that China is in a commanding position to throttle Japan's energy and economic lifelines traversing the South China Sea, it is my assessment that China would be in a rude shock  if it attempts to do so.

Expectedly, Japan and the United States would not be alone in checkmating China's military adventurism in the Indo Pacific. There is intense regional polarisation against China which stands intensified after the China Virus19 Pandemic emerging from Wuhan.

In terms of Indo Pacific Security, China fears Japan more as a potent threat to China than India as the other important Major Power in the US-led Indo Pacific Security Template.

The above by itself is a ringing testimony to Japan's unique positioning as a significant Major Power and major player in Indo Pacific security in the unfolding decades ahead. Notably, this unique significance rests with Japan presently not even having opted for a nuclear weapons arsenal.

Japan going nuclear, and which I have been advocating right from 2002 onwards, would pose nightmares in Beijing.