UNITED STATES AND INDIA IN 2023 ARE IN A QUASI-MILITARY ALLIANCE TRANSCENDING A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The United States-India Strategic Partnership whose inception took place in 2000 has in 2023 evolved into a Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership which in form and substance today is a "Quasi-Military Alliance" transcending the dimensions of a mere Strategic Partnership. 

The only difference between a Formal Military Alliance and "Quasi-Military Alliance" is that a Formal Military Alliance is defined by a formal 'Security Treaty' and a "Quasi-Military Alliance" incorporates a set of defence and security cooperation agreements without an over-arching Formal Security Treaty.

In both cases, a formal or quasi-military alliance, the objective is to cater for security cooperation against a 'Common Perceived Threat'. In a formal military alliance, the perceived threat is spelt out in terms of 'capabilities and intentions'.

In a "Quasi-Military Alliance" the 'Perceived Threat' may be spelt out 'explicitly' or 'implicitly' forms the basis of a set of defense and security agreements.

The US-India Comprehensive Special Global Partnership when examined in light of the above parameters deucedly falls into the category of a "Quasi-Military Alliance" both in the bilateral context and also in the multilateral context.

The common perceived threat in the bilateral context is the 'China Threat' which has manifested itself unambiguously in the Indo Pacific against India and the United States.

In the multilateral context, countries extending from South Korea, Japan and Australia too perceive the 'China Threat' directly as impacting on their national security interests. 

When viewed as an integrated whole in relation to the 'China Threat' in Indo Pacific, the security template that has emerged in 2023 in the IndoPacific is a set of bilateral security alliances between United States and South Korea, Japan and Australia and the bilateral US-India Comprehensive Special Global Partnership. Additionally, India has bilateral Strategic partnership agreements with Japan, Australia and South Korea.

Superimposed on the above security template in Indo Pacific are multilateral security groups like the QUAD Security Initiative comprising United States, Japan, India & Australia and AUKUS comprising USA, UK &Australia.

With NATO also perceiving the 'China Threat' to NATO's Southern Flank and with Major European Powers asserting their "stakes" in Indo Pacific security, an Eastern NATO is a possibility that now hovers over the horizon, and this was discussed in my last Paper.

Concluding, it needs to be noted with serious emphasis that however Indian foreign policy planners disavow military alliances, the stark reality in 2023 and likely to be reinforced by unfolding events in IndoPacific is that the 'China Threat' has nudged India into a "Quasi-Military Alliance" with the United States. 

Semantics aside, this is the whole truth and for India's strategic and security good. India needs to position itself securely in a heavily polarized Bipolar World which does not offer India bandwidth to indulge in shibboleths like non-Alignment 2.0 or Multipolarity.

   

IS EASTERN NATO IN OFFING? NATO OPENS LIAISON OFFICE IN JAPAN

China needs to blame itself for hastening the likelihood of an 'Eastern NATO' emerging as NATO-type security alliance in Western Pacific in response to its persistent warmongering over Taiwan and its aggression in South China Sea.

The likelihood of an Eastern NATO coming into existence figured spasmodically in global strategic analyses for last three decades. These speculative analyses were directly related to the intensity of the 'China Threat' perceived by the Nations of the Western Pacific and the United States as the Net Security Provider of the Region.

The China Threat intensity in 2023 has started to figure alarmingly in threat perceptions of United States and its key Allies in Western Pacific, namely, Japan and South Korea.

In response to China Threat assuming threatening proportions the United States under three Presidents has pivoted back to Indo Pacific security in a hyper-active posture--- reinforcing security ties with Japan & South Korea, reclaiming Philippines in its security fold and enlarging its erstwhile US Pacific Command to US Indo Pacific Command, recognizing the significance of the Indian Ocean and India to Western Pacific security.

Contextually, United States reviving the QUAD in 2017 and thereafter forging AUKUS has to be seen in the above context.

In tandem, the China Theat started figuring as a 'Threat Perception' in NATO planning. In NATO Document 'NATO Blueprint 2030' China found mention as a 'Threat' more specifically to NATO'S Southern Flank and East Mediterranean.

NATO'S Major Members like France, UK and Germany have legitimate security interests in Indian Ocean security and in South China Sea being contested by China.

In the above perspective, NATO Secretary General had visited Japan and South Korea some months back for high level consultations.

Japan and South Korea have been invited to attend NATO Vilnius Summit later this year along with Australia and New Zealand.

NATO therefore opening a 'Liaison & Coordination Office' in Tokyo and Japan willing to host NATO Liaison & Coordination Office in its capital significantly indicates that there is a growing synergy between NATO, a Euro-centric Security Alliance with the US Security Architecture in Western Pacific.

Opening of a NATO Liaison & Coordination Office in Tokyo would facilitate closer coordination between NATO and Japan and South Korea. To this could be added Philippines too based on recent indicators.

China has reacted sharply to this development and the growing strategic proximity of Japan and South Korea after decades of mistrust.

Could this be the harbinger of an 'Eastern NATO' coming into existence? The present development is pregnant with such a possibility.

Concluding, it needs to be stressed that NATOs more intense linkages with Western Pacific Allies of United States adds one more significant layer to the US-led extended deterrence against the looming China Threat in Indo Pacific.

UNITED STATES POLITICAL WILL CAN BE GRAVELY TESTED IF CHINA LAUNCHES MILITARY INVASION OF TAIWAN

China's military invasion of Taiwan has been an ongoing reality whose imminence in 2023 acquires a menacing urgency for China post-Ukraine and the 'Strategic Hemming-in' of China generated by United States crafted China-centric security architecture in Western Pacific and Indo Pacific Region as a whole.

China's response on the rebound focusses on a two-pronged strategy against the United States-led security alliances and groupings like QUAD & AUKUS.

China's exponential military upgradation and honing of its war-waging capabilities is also accompanied by Hybrid Warfare of creating domestic political turbulence in USA, Japan & and also drive wedges/ uncertainties between United States and Major allies and partners like Japan, Australia and India.

China's 'Military Invasion' of Taiwan is a "CERTAINTY' which cannot await US military estimates that China will only be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.

Analytically, it is assessed, that in 2023, the United States has in place military deployments and strength both of its own and that of its Allies, to thwart China's invasion plans of Taiwan and should China does invade Taiwan in a lightning strike, the United States can militarily force China to recoil.

The United States Armed Forces have prevailed in all wars of 20th & 21st Centuries and where victories were denied like in Vietnam and Afghanistan, it was due to lack of American 'Political Will' and 'Political Micro-management' of military operations by Washington civilians, as often reflected in my past writings.

The crucial question in 2023 is therefore whether the United States can display the 'Political Will' should China impulsively launch military invasion of Taiwan anytime now? 

Many imponderables prevail, but the United States has traditionally shown remarkable resilience to take 'Hard Decisions'.

In 2023 and months to follow the United States 'Political Will' is likely to be tested gravely as China's President Xi Jinping inpelled by his'Great China Dream' unwiitingly provokes the United States strategic forbearance.

Notwithstanding the above, Major Asian Powers and in capitals of the Indo Pacific Region there is an 'Expectancy' that the United States should not await being prodded by China but act decisively to exhibit its resolve as China like all bullies undrstands only the language of force applied with firm resolve.

As an initial display of United States 'Political Will' the US President should declare that America's "ONE-CHINA POLICY IS DEAD" and that Taiwan is a Sovereign Country !!!

PHILIPPINES PIVOTS BACK TO UNITED STATES IN 2023 DUE INTENSIFYING CHINA THREAT

Significant for Indo Pacific Security against the pervasive China Threat in the region, the Philippines belatedly has made a pivot back to the United States security architecture in the Western Pacific. 

The Philippines under new President Marcos Jr has granted United States access to a total of nine military bases against five earlier.

In 1992, the Philippines Senate by a majority of "one vote' only ended the lease of US major military bases at Subic Bay Naval Base and Clarkes Air Force Base where more than 20,000 US miliary personnel were based permanently in return for sizeable US economic aid.

By 1998, Philippines revised its stance. Without giving permanent bases it signed agreements with United States for rotational 'Visiting Forces' access to five bases both for rotational presence and Joint Military Exercises.

During this 30 years gap, the Philippines was trying to balance its relations with China sitting menacingly on its doorsteps.

China tried its best to drive a wedge between United States and Philippines by trade and economic inducements. China also focused subtly on Filipino sensitivities on national sovereignty. It seems to have worked for China for some years.

China in tandem however did not restrain its aggressive impulses in occupying Filipino Islands/Reefs in South China Sea and other maritime encroachments in Filipino maritime domains.

This was markedly so after 2012 with ascendancy of Xi Jinping as President of China. Due to Filipino domestic political dynamics the looming China Threat stood relegated in national security policy.

The Philippines new President Marcos Jr soon after assuming office paid a visit to China. Seemingly, President Marcos Jr returned convinced that in interests of Filipino national security interests against intensifying China Threat, it would be prudent for the Philippines to pivot back to United States security fold.

The Philippines finally recognized that the Nation's security against the China Threat could best be secured by an unambiguous pivot back to United States strategic fold.

The strategic spin-off has been a significant rebound for United States Rotational Military Presence in Philippines where now against the earlier access to five bases, the United States will have now access to four more military bases.

Reportedly, these additional four bases are in North Philippines facing Taiwan and disputed South China Sea Islands.

The United States makes significant geopolitical and strategic gains with Philippines granting access to a total of nine military bases for US Military Forces.

The Philippines stands to gain strategically and economically with its pivot back to United States fold shedding its strategic ambiguities. Surely, greater US financial assistance will flow-in.

In tandem, countries like Japan would also follow suit by enhancing security and economic relations with the Philippines. In fact, Japan has been involved in 'Capacity Building' of the Philippines Navy. 

The United States regains its strategic salience in the Philippines national security calculus in relation the China Threat which has now heated up for the Philippines.

The United States gains geopoliticallly also in that its Western Pacific Outer Perimeter now becomes more security tight and politically robust.

The United States by enhanced accesses to nine military bases in the Philippines is afforded a higher military profile to deal with China-generated 'Explosive Flash Points' in South China Sea and China's brinkmanship on Taiwan Invasion.

Obviously, due to security reasons no firm details of the new Agreement stand released by United States nor the Philippines, but it can be analyzed that United States would gain greater access to establish advanced surveillance and intelligence gathering facilities against China.

The United States can also be expected to pre-position military equipment for contingencies in relation to Taiwan and South China Sea.

China has obviously expressed its deep concerns in Philippines granting increased access to United States to military bases in Filipino territory.

China can be expected to raise turbulence in the South China Sea as in more ways than one China's attempted 'Full Spectrum Dominance' in South China Sea is that much neutralized.

In passing, it needs to be highlighted that Philippines is aware that China Threat is "Real", maybe not an outright military invasion, but manifesting in terms of political and military coercion. Notably, India has contracted to supply three batteries of BRAHMOS Missiles to the Philippines.

Overall, in geopolitical and strategic terms it is a significant gain for US-led Indo Pacific security template.

 

INDIA AND INDO PACIFIC SECURITY---STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES MUST PREDOMINATE GEOPOLITICAL BALANCING

'Geopolitical Balancing' has long been the forte' of the Indian policy establishment but with global geopolitics heavily polarized post-Ukraine Invasion by Russia, no policy spaces exist for geopolitical balancing by India between the United States-led Indo Pacific security order and the much-crystallized Russia-China Axis.

India in 2023 has to make fateful choices wherein Indian policy establishment needs to give a pass to geopolitical balancing between two opposing Power Blocs now set on path of armed confrontation and let more critical strategic imperatives be determinants of India's policy postures.

The Russia-China Axis is now an established strategic reality and cannot be wished away. In terms of India's policy formulations, India long depended on Russia as a trusted friend to prevail over China for restraint in escalation of military confrontation on India's Norhtern Borders with China Occupied Tibet.

Russia with an utter political and economic dependency on China and which dependency is likely to intensify is decreasingly ineffective as an existential countervailing influence on China.

Russia-India relations can be said to have entered a phase of strategic denouement in which both sides have lost most of the strategic convergences which prevailed in earlier decades, markedly so, as the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership has acquired substantial contours.

Today, the picture prevailing is that the United States and India share more strategic convergences on global issue and regional threats, than India shares with Russia.

The United States growingly perceives India as a pivotal strategic partner where with growing 'Strategic Trust', the United States sees merit in giving India access and sharing even 'Critical Technologies' besides designating India as a 'Preferred Strategic Partner'.

Can India therefore persist in continuing to be a member of US-led QUAD and China-dominated SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) at the same time when both are patently Security Groupings strategically aimed at each other?

Can India afford to remain as Member of BRICS wherein India stands singly alone with Russia, China, and South Africa beholden to each other to the extent of Joint Naval Exercises in the Indian Ocean Rim?

Strategic Reality Check would suggest an emphatic NO as the answer. India should therefore dispense with its SCO and BRICS affiliations.

Contextually, therefore, India has critical policy challenges of shedding the ambiguities that plague Indian policymaking, in which " Neutral Stances or Strategic Non-Alignment or Non-Alignment 2.0 are NO LONGER VALID CHOICES"

Concluding, it is strongly emphasized that India as an aspiring Major Global Power must not be seen as 'dithering' in terms of its capability of making 'Hard Strategic Choices'.

India in 2023 is a 'Natural Ally" of the West led by United States and which has in its fold Major West European Nations, Japan, Australia and South Korea with which India has forged Strategic Relationships. 

India' by its demonstrated policy preferences of last two decades has vividly thrown its lot as 'Natural Ally' of the West and should firmly stick to this course otherwise India with its perceived policy ambiguities in the unpredictable global churning currently in play could end up as a strategic loser.     

 

Tod