UNITED STATES AND INDIA CAN GEOPOLITICALLY ILL-AFFORD STRATEGIC DENOUEMENT AGAINST CHINA THREAT

United States and India in 2022 post-Ukraine can ill-afford to be in strategic denouement with each other when geopolitically measured against the China Threat intensely impacting both United States and India besides generating overall security turbulence in Indo Pacific.

In end-2022, this precisely seems to be underway, seemingly, when the dots are joined of geopolitical events and developments involving United States and India in the aftermath of Ukraine Invasion by Russia which suggest that hairline cracks are threatening the US -India Strategic Partnership.

Strategic Partnerships to be robust thrive on 'Mutual Strategic Trust' and respect for each other's strategic sensitivities. But the opposite seems to be taking place in US-India relations post -Ukraine Invasion by Russia.

Objectively and sequentially analyzing the developing strategic perceptional differences the stage seems to have been set by India with its diplomatic reluctance to condemn Russia over its Ukraine Invasion where Russia indulged in a virtual genocidal 'War of Choice' without any provocations from Ukraine.

Seven months down the line, India is still not naming Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Major Powers and Major Powers-in-the making should have strengths and resilience to take major challenging geopolitical decisions. 

India's reluctance to decouple itself from its 'Russia Obsession' was patiently borne by United States accepting Indian perceptions that India's dependence on Russia weaponry inhibited India from doing so. During this period United States did not even invoke CATSA sanctions against India for purchase of S-00 ADM systems.

However, in end-2022 United States geopolitical patience seems to have been worn out and joining the dots of US-end generated steps suggest that United States strategic denouement with India is setting-in.

Notably, US $ 450 million F-16 upgrade package to Pakistan, postponing Pakistan's $ 140million debt repayment, week-long ongoing visit of Pakistan Army Chief to US, and significantly the Trilateral Defence Ministers Meeting of QUAD Nations in Hawaii of USA, Japan & Australia, minus India, are ominous for India.

India therefore crucially now stares at the following challenges:(1) Geopolitically in 2022 when global geopolitics have turned on its head post-Ukraine Invasion by Russia in favor of United States, should India persist with its 'Russian Hangover'? (2) Global geopolitics in end-2022 is revolving around 'Balance of Power' power-play and offers no bandwidth to India for 'Multilateralism' (3) How long India can keep trading its geopolitical weightage to United States without exhibiting its intentions to be a serious player in "Security Roles" of Indo Pacific security? (4) How long India can "Shirk from Calling Out the China Threat at World Forums"?

Concluding, it needs to be stressed that both United States and India cannot have different perceptions on the China Threat. If that be so, then the Indian answers to the above questions should be obvious.

 The US-India Strategic Partnership forged at the turn of the Milennium was predicated on the China Threat and that hovers more threateningly post-Ukraine. United States and India should therefore not permit any 'Strategic Distrust' to hover above the robustness of US-India Strategic Partnership.

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FRANCE AND INDIA SHARE GSIGNIFICANT STRATEIC CONVERGENCES ON CHINA THREAT TO INDO PACIFIC SECURITY

The China Threat to Indo Pacific security and stability has implicitly been taken cognizance of by France and India during the recent September 2022 visit of French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonne to New Delhi. Going by the assertive statements made on imperatives of a 'Free & Open IndoPacific' the strategic convergences indicate that both France and India intend intensifying jointly their strategic cooperation towards Indo Pacific security. 

Notably, unlike India, which is a late entrant into the domain of Indo Pacific security, France has a military presence in both the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean on its island territories in terms of military, naval and air bases.

France based on Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean garrisons has at its command appreciable intelligence acquisition and force projection capabilities in both these Oceans.

France is the only major European Power to have the above capabilities in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

The above contextually becomes vital especially in the South Pacific Islands nations where China's intrusive presence is adding yet another strategic concern to Indo Pacific security.

India on the other hand is a Member Nation of the US-led Quadrilateral Security Initiative comprising United States, Japan, Australia and India. 

The QUAD is for all practical purposes a 'China-Deterrent' security grouping despite QUAD other members deferring to Indian hedging on naming the China Threat by applying non-security labels.

France like India has crafted a web of bilateral security relationships with countries in the Indo Pacific in addition to India like Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand.

Superimposing the French and Indian templates of security relationships the Indo Pacific on each other, what emerges is a mosaic of over-lapping convergences between France and India on Indo Pacific security which can contribute handsomely to the existing US-led security architecture.

In relation to the China Threat, the same now   figures in European Union and NATO perspectives of which France is a member.

 Significant scope therefore lies for both France and India in intensification of their Strategic Partnership with strong convergences on Indo Pacific security and stability.

 

 

INDIA'S STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES TO VIEW R USSIA AND CHINATHROUGH RUSSIA-CHINA AXIS PRISM

India's policy establishment in 2022 has to grapple with the challenge that in terms of policy planning it now has to base its foreign policy perspectives on the emerged reality of the Russia-China Axis as a power bloc in direct confrontation with the Global Democracies headed by the United States and includes India.

Reflecting on this aspect was an assertion made by me in an analytical piece in Eurasia Review onSeptember 1 2022 on the evolving Cold War 2.0 polarised environment, isxna AThe intensifiction of the Russia-Chiisxna Axis andia its implications for Ind

 The most significant points made in this Analysis were 

• Russia and China cannot be the vectors of Indian foreign policy."
• "Inia cannot be on wrong side of global geopolitics and global polarization."
• "During Cold War 2.0 India will have no bandwidth to revel in tadeonal foreign policy shibboleths of Non-Alignment, Non-Alignment, or Strategic Autonomy."
•  "India should not send confusing signals to Global Democracies that it still has lingering affections for the Russia-China Axis."

India can no longer strategically afford to base its policy perspectives on Russia and China as two separate entities but adopt the policy planning prism of the Russia-China Axis as a "Geopolitical Whole" and a   'Strategic Whole'.  

No further proof is required of Rusia-China Axis having been operationalized than the Rusia-China Axis in play on India's doorsteps in South Asia marginalizing India on Afghanistan furthering China's and Pakistan's strategic interests.

Russia's policy profile in the last five years amply denotes that when Russia will be faced to make choices between respecting China's strategic sensitivities and India's strategic sensitivities, Russia would unhesitatingly side with China.

Russia would accord priority to Russia-China Axis strategic objectives in relation to its overall confrontation with United States led Global Democracies than to honor India's lingering strategic obsession that Russia would at best stay neutral.

India opting for 'virtual alignment with Global Democracies' in terms of Indo Pacific security mechanisms does not require amplification. What requires amplification is that India has to make tough choices of openly asserting its strategic preferences and choices.

If Indian PM Modi has boldly shed all the shibboleths of India's Nehruvian foreign policy what holds PM Modi with his indomitable outlook to "DECOUPLE" India from India's self-imposed Russian manacles?

India's intentions, other than 'Risk Aversion' instincts of Nehruvian hangovers lingering in Indian foreign policy establishment, seem to drive India's lingering attachment to Russia despite Russia making its intentions clear on the concretizing of the Russia-China Axis.

Concluding, it needs forceful emphasis that Inda's rise to a Major Global Player can only be facilitated by the Major Powers of Global Democracies and not by Russia and certainly not China and the Russia-China Axis. So why India's diffidence in terms of unambiguous assertion of its strategic preferences and directions?

UNITED STATES-INDIA MILITARY ALLIANCE IS A STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE FOR INDIA IN 2020s CONTEXT

Geopolitical churning and strategic uncertainties generated by the institutionalizing of the Russia-China Axis post-Ukraine, has imposed a Cold War 2.0 Template on global security, and particularly of the Indo Pacific of which India is now a pivotal part.

Unlike Cold War 1.0 where India could revel under Nehruvian delusions of Non Alignment and indulge in moral pontifications to the world, that subterfuge for a non-assertive or 'Risk Aversion' foreign policy is no longer available in evolving Cold War 2.0 Template to India.

Contextually, the arenas of global flash-points during Cold War I.0 were distant from India. In the unfolding Cold War 2.0 scenario the global conflictual flash-points are right at India's doorsteps along the Himalayan Heights astride which an overly aggressive China sits menacingly.

India's Western Security Flank is a threatening flank with possibilities of a Two Front War imposed on India by the China-Pakistan Axis.

The Indian Ocean  which India traditionally predominated stands intruded by Chinese Navy, Chinese Navy submarines and China's sea-dominance being unfolded by access to China's debt-ridden States like Pakistan and Sri Lanka naval bases at Gwadur and Hambantota.

These threatening scenarios raises some crucial questions, namely, (1) Can India on her own defence capabilities without external involvement withstand China's strategic onslaught blueprint against India (2) Can India on her own naval might contend with China's aim to dominate India's sea-flanks? (3) Can India's policy establishment realistically not divine China's strategic blueprint to block India's rise as a Major Power?

Regrettably for India the answers to all of the above crucial questions vitally affecting India's sovereignty and security are in the "negative".

The fast-track military buildup and indigenous defence production initiated by the Modi Government would take another ten years to provide effective conventional deterrence. It has to first catch-up with ten years of "Neglect of India's War Preparedness" of Congress Governments 200-14.

In the context of desirability of military alliances as a bulwark against wayward and aggressive 'Revisionist Powers'the recent Ukraine Invasion by Russia becomes a quotable example. Would Russia have launched a massive invasion of Ukraine if it was a NATO Alliance member-State?

Concluding, when the US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership has evolved in 2022 in visible contours of a 'Virtual Military Alliance' with integrated security mechanisms and with India part of QUAD and I2U2 , what holds back India from endowing the 'Virtual Military Alliance' with United States with the honorific of a "US-India Military Alliance"?

This is the realistic 'Strategic Option' for India whose geopolitical and strategic time has arrived. 

UNITED STATES TAKE GLOBAL LEAD IN REPUDIATION OF "ONE-CHINA POLICY"

 Geopolitical dynamics in play in 2022 dictate strong imperatives for the United States to give a global lead in repudiation of the "One China Policy" mistakenly perceived and   adopted since 1972. In the wake of this policy, China has emerged not only as the 'Prime Threat' to US national security but also has emboldened China to contest United States traditional strategic predominance in the Indo Pacific.

The spillover from the above has tempted China to aggressive brinkmanship and conflict on all of China's peripheries from India's Eastern Ladakh borders with China Occupied Tibet to South China Sea.

Repudiation of "One China Policy" by United States would set in motion similar diplomatic de-recognition of "One China Policy" an  lead to full recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign independent nation.

What can China do in the wake of United States repudiation of the "One China Policy" with other nations too following the US lead?

Can China go to war on this count  against the United States  and other countries doing so similarly?

China in 2022, long pointed by me since 2015, is strategically besieged both externally and internally. China has by its aggressive actions is virtually isolated diplomatically. Major Nations of the Indo Pacific are in "diplomatic sufferance" of China sheerly because of United States strategic ambiguities on China.

China's economy is no longer vibrant and possibly downslide  further due to broken supply chains and loss of confidence in China's economic credibility especially as after-effects of China not owning up on Wuhan Virus 19 emanating from biological warfare experiments political power struggle from Wuhan laboratories.

China's domestic upheavals can be predicted arising from possible economic miseries and domestic political power struggles challenging President Xi Jinping.

Contextually therefore China is in no position to go to war on the question of repudiation  by United States of the "One China Policy".

Concluding it needs emphasis that China in decades post-1972 was all along "boxing much above its strategic weight" due United States policies of 'China Hedging" and 'Risk Aversion'. United States by doing so has enabled emergence of China as a demonic aggressive Power with Hitlerian impulses. High time the United States "DE-THRONES"China for its own good and security.