JAPAN DOUBLES ITS DEFENCE BUDGET TO COPE WITH ENHANCED CHINA THREAT PERCEPTIONS & POST-UKRAINE LESSONS

Japanese PM Kishida rightly described December 16, 2022, as a "Turning Point" in Japan's national security and defence policies when he announced doubling of Japan's Defence Budget from decades-old limit of 1% of GDP to 2% of GDP in response to enhanced China Threat perceptions and military lessons post-Ukraine invasion by Russia.

Japanese PM Kishida unveiled a $ 320 Billion Five Year Plan which would make Japan the world's third largest military spender. 

Japanese Armed Forces were already a potent military force, but its radius of action was self-imposed to immediate defence of Japanese Islands.

Japan's new National Defense Strategy will impart Japanese Armed Forces with conventional 'Second Strike' Capabilities against China.

Japan's enhanced China Threat perceptions have arisen from China's military intimidation of Taiwan and open display of military might by intrusions in airspace and waters around Taiwan.

China has been indulging in submarines and Chinese Navy ships intrusions in Japanese waters. 

In Japanese Threat Perceptions, China's military occupation of Taiwan coupled with China's Full Spectrum Dominance of South China Sea would be strangling Japan's lifelines of energy supplies and trade.

Post-Ukraine invasion of Ukraine by Russia, Japan has drawn tow important military lessons (1) Russia has set a wrong precedent of unprovoked invasion of a smaller neighbor, and which precedent may encourage China not only for military occupation of Taiwan but also Chinese military occupation of disputed Japanese Senkaku Islands.

The second major lesson that Japan has drawn post-Ukraine is that Japan must now militarily be prepared for a prolonged conflict and have military infrastructure and logistics sustainability for prolonged warfare.

Japan's new major military spending doubled to unprecedented levels therefore caters for the twin challenges of (1) Enhanced offensive military capabilities and 'counter-strike' capabilities against its perceived enemies, and (2) Rapid buildup of military logistics infrastructure and WWR (War Wastage Reserves) of holdings of reserve stocks of weapons, military equipment and ammunition to fight and militarily sustain the Armed Forces in event of prolonged conflict.

Reflecting Japan's new resolve to meet enhanced new threats to Japanese security, Japan released three important Documents (1) National Security Strategy (2) National Defense Strategy, and (3) Defense Forces Development Plans.

Surprisingly, reports indicate that nearly 70% of Japanese public supports Japan raising its military preparedness. This is a marked departure from the past normally pacifist inclinations of Japanese public.

The only vociferous opposition to Japan's doubling of defence expenditure has emanated from China which has accused Japan of whipping up regional tensions as pretext to breakthroughs in defence spending. Surely, Japan's acquisition of 'Counter Strike ' capabilities would have a

rattled China.

Concluding, it needs emphasis that Japanese Defence Buildup to credible proportions against enlarging China Threat was overdue. China itself has to blame for pushing Japan in this direction.

In terms of overall Indo Pacific security, Japan's enhanced defence buildup and assertive security profile would impose a cautionary deterrent to China's unrestrained aggressiveness in the region.

'THE SAMURAI HAS ARISEN!!!

UNITED STATES- JAPAN-SOUTH KOREA SECURITY TRILATERAL CRYSTALLISING IN 2022

Geopolitical realities unfolding in Indo Pacific in wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China Threat of Taiwan invasion, Russia-China Axis solidifying and North Korea as China's nuclear proxy destabilizing the Korean Peninsula with repeated missiles tests has forcefully dawned on South Korea the imperatives of regional security resting on a US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral.

US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral was a Strategic Imperative even in Cold War I when Russia Threat was at its peak. In Cold War II, China Threat to Indo Pacific has emerged in more menacing contours surpassing the erstwhile Russia Threat. 

Geopolitical and strategic imperatives are therefore more pressing in 2022 closing weeks for speedy integration and operationalization of the US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral.

Initial moves in this direction were visible from November 2022 onwards with Defense Ministers and senior military officials from the three countries holding consultations.

It needs to be recalled that the United States has Bilateral Secuity Treaties with Japan and South Korea. The missing piece in this security geometry in Western Pacifici was an integrated US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral.

For decades, the resistance to this pressing triangular security mechanism stemmed from South Korea opposing it for no other good reason than perceived historical wrongs of South Korea over Japanese colonial rule over South Korea in the last century.

South Korea's reluctance in the past also arose from China being able to drive a wedge in Japan-South Korean relations t suit its strategic ends. In this direction China's economic inducements to South Krea were manipulated by China.

Fortunately, the situation has changed with the Conservative President Yoon taking over the reins of power in Seoul this year. President Yoon realized that South Korean policies of past Presidents of 'Reconciliation' with North Korea had failed miserably when contextually viewed against North Korea's blatant military provocations in the last one year.

Analytically, lurking in South Korea's new policy calculations of positive approach towards a US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral would be the stark realization that China despite professions of friendship towards Soth Korea had not actively restrained North Korea - its satellite, from aggressive provocations against South Korea, leaving Japan aside.

Perceptionaly, it appears that China wanted North Korea to intensify its aggressive provocations of missile firings post-Ukraine War by Russia. It suited China in diversion of attention from its Taiwan military adventurism and also US sole strategic focus on assisting Ukraine against Russia 

South Korea too like United States and Japan has significant stakes in security and stability of Western Pacific and South China Sea which China has disrupted with its aggressive moves.

Concluding, in interests of overall Indo Pacific security considerations, Western Pacific security and more specifically stability and security of the Korean Peninsula, the crystallization of the US-Japan-South Korea Security Trilateral needs to be welcomed as a mature security imperative well recognized.

INDIAN NAVY CHIEF'S SIGNIFICANT PRESENCE AT QUAD NAVAL CHIEFS SUMMIT MEET IN TOKYO NOVEMBER 2022

 Significantly strategic messaging stood conveyed by Indian Navy Chief Admiral Harikumar's presence in the opticals of the four Naval Chiefs of QUAD Navies posing together in a formal photograph of the QUAD Naval Chiefs Summit in Tokyo, Japan on November 05, 2022.

Significant it was, as if memory serves me correctly, this was the first time that a Naval Chiefs of QUAD Nations has taken place.

Significant strategically, was the conflictual backdrop of Indo Pacific prevailing turbulent security environment induced by China's saber-rattling over Taiwan, Chinese satellite North Korea's proxy missiles firings across Japan and the overhang of Russia Invasion of Ukraine casting shadows on IndoPacific security.

In a strategic triple whammy, which would not have gone unnoticed in Beijing, the QUAD Naval Chiefs Summit in Tokyo also coincided with Japan's Internatinal Fleet Review, commencement of the 'Malabar Navl Exercises' in Japanese seas of QUAD Navies and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.

The Indian Naval Chief 's presence was scheduled at all these events.

Significantly, in my assessments over decades, is the reality that while Chinese Navy may be numerically stronger in numbers of Navy combatant ships, but the Japanese Navy is "Qualitatively Superior" and more powerful than the Beijing's Chinese Navy.

When QUAD Navy Chiefs main theme of discussion focusses on "Interoperability" then the strategic message should be amply clear. They had not met in Tokyo for a garden party! 

Humanitarian and disaster relief missions overplayed by Indian diplomacy are overshadowed by the real intent of QUAD when it was resurrected in 2017. The real intent is checkmating China and the maritime threats that China poses in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Concluding, it needs to be stressed that India must invest more heavily on the strategic intents of QUAD Nations and make it more potent in naval terms. It should not be forgotten, as I have stressed in my writings and even on TV Channels, that India can keep the Indian Ocean as "Indian" against China's naval depredations only with deep collaboration of QUAD Nations Navies. 

In overall pursuance of India's national security interests, India should now refrain from de-emphasizing of QUAD's real strategic intent. The QUAD Naval Chiefs Summit meet in Tokyo seems to be the first step in that direction.

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CHINA'S ENHANCED AGGRESSIVENESS PORTENDED UNDER PRESDENT XI JINPING'S UNPRECEDENTED THIRD TERM

 Chinese President Xi Jinping having ruthlessly ensured an unprecedented third term as President of China with absolute control over the Communist Party apparatus and the PLA military machine portends enhanced aggressiveness for Indo Pacific which abounds in China-generated flashpoints.

President Xi Jinping's signature tune in his earlier two Presidencies was adding incendiary contours to China's military aggressiveness and brinkmanship on all of China's peripheries extending from India's Himalayan Frontiers with China Occupied Tibet to the maritime domains of the Western Pacific, notably South China Sea.

President Xi Jinping's ascendancy to power in Beijing in 2012 was significantly marked by China's switch from 'Soft Power' policies to exercise of   'Hard Power' political and military intimidation of its Indo Pacific neighbors.

China's aggressiveness under President Xi was not limited to its Indo Pacific neighbors but also extended to 'challenge' United States supremacy in Western Pacific. China's establishment of 'Full Spectrum' dominance over the South China Sea under President Xi was only belatedly challenged by United States President Trump and thereafter.

 In my assessment, Chinese President fortified by Chinese PLA massed military and naval power and emboldened by United States strategic distraction to Europe over Russia's invasion of Ukraine could be tempted to flex his military muscles on its Indo Pacific peripheries.

China's enhanced aggressiveness during President Xi's third term on its peripheries is also likely to be generated by domestic compulsions of diverting growing political and economic discontent by whipping up Chinese Nationalism.

Concluding, China's enhanced aggressiveness in Indo Pacific assessed as likely during President Xi Jinping's third term because of contextual factors needs to be checkmated by "Enhanced Security Content" of QUAD and forging a US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral. Indo Pacific nations included ASEAN cannot afford to be divided on the China Threat.

UNITED STATES AND INDIA CAN GEOPOLITICALLY ILL-AFFORD STRATEGIC DENOUEMENT AGAINST CHINA THREAT

United States and India in 2022 post-Ukraine can ill-afford to be in strategic denouement with each other when geopolitically measured against the China Threat intensely impacting both United States and India besides generating overall security turbulence in Indo Pacific.

In end-2022, this precisely seems to be underway, seemingly, when the dots are joined of geopolitical events and developments involving United States and India in the aftermath of Ukraine Invasion by Russia which suggest that hairline cracks are threatening the US -India Strategic Partnership.

Strategic Partnerships to be robust thrive on 'Mutual Strategic Trust' and respect for each other's strategic sensitivities. But the opposite seems to be taking place in US-India relations post -Ukraine Invasion by Russia.

Objectively and sequentially analyzing the developing strategic perceptional differences the stage seems to have been set by India with its diplomatic reluctance to condemn Russia over its Ukraine Invasion where Russia indulged in a virtual genocidal 'War of Choice' without any provocations from Ukraine.

Seven months down the line, India is still not naming Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Major Powers and Major Powers-in-the making should have strengths and resilience to take major challenging geopolitical decisions. 

India's reluctance to decouple itself from its 'Russia Obsession' was patiently borne by United States accepting Indian perceptions that India's dependence on Russia weaponry inhibited India from doing so. During this period United States did not even invoke CATSA sanctions against India for purchase of S-00 ADM systems.

However, in end-2022 United States geopolitical patience seems to have been worn out and joining the dots of US-end generated steps suggest that United States strategic denouement with India is setting-in.

Notably, US $ 450 million F-16 upgrade package to Pakistan, postponing Pakistan's $ 140million debt repayment, week-long ongoing visit of Pakistan Army Chief to US, and significantly the Trilateral Defence Ministers Meeting of QUAD Nations in Hawaii of USA, Japan & Australia, minus India, are ominous for India.

India therefore crucially now stares at the following challenges:(1) Geopolitically in 2022 when global geopolitics have turned on its head post-Ukraine Invasion by Russia in favor of United States, should India persist with its 'Russian Hangover'? (2) Global geopolitics in end-2022 is revolving around 'Balance of Power' power-play and offers no bandwidth to India for 'Multilateralism' (3) How long India can keep trading its geopolitical weightage to United States without exhibiting its intentions to be a serious player in "Security Roles" of Indo Pacific security? (4) How long India can "Shirk from Calling Out the China Threat at World Forums"?

Concluding, it needs to be stressed that both United States and India cannot have different perceptions on the China Threat. If that be so, then the Indian answers to the above questions should be obvious.

 The US-India Strategic Partnership forged at the turn of the Milennium was predicated on the China Threat and that hovers more threateningly post-Ukraine. United States and India should therefore not permit any 'Strategic Distrust' to hover above the robustness of US-India Strategic Partnership.

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