Contextually, a China-India War is inevitable viewing India's Northern Himalayan Borders with China Occupied Tibet in 2023 being conflictual and explosive with China deploying massed military formations reflecting its strategic intent to coerce India to submit to China's delineation of its perceived "Strategic Frontiers".
China's belligerence against India is bound to intensify and its military responses against India can escalate in response to India's rising military profile and India reducing its military asymmetries with China's Comprehensive Military Power.
Medium and long-range military indicators suggest that China's President-for-Life Xi Jinping in pursuit of his grandiose Greater China Dream perceives India's geopolitical postures impeding his obsessive ambition.
With President Xi Jinping at the helm and casting himself in the mould of Chairman Mao Tse Tung's 'Great Helmsman' role, the temptation for another China-India War exists substantially, notwithstanding India's stiff military standoffs against China at Dokalam and more notably at Galwan recently.
With such a strategic backdrop it becomes imperative for India's security establishment to analyze Russia's and United States possible strategic postures in the event of a second major China-India War, which may not be a short-duration War.
Analytically, geopolitical factors prevailing in 2023 and likely to unfold for another two decades at least, suggest two contrasting strategic postures of Russia and United States in the event of the next China-India War.
Russia post-Ukraine, more specially, enfeebled both geopolitically and militarily, will be in no position to provide even the semblance of any countervailing influence over China to dissuade it from its impulsive instincts for war with India.
India's security establishment needs to remember the historical record of then Former USSR responses to China-India War 1962. Russia was then a powerful Superpower, geopolitically and militarily powerful. Yet even despite its recent armed Border Conflicts with China on disputed Ussuri River territories, Russia adopted a neutral posture in China-India War 1962.
Strategic reality check of that period glaringly highlights that it was the United States and Western Countries that rushed-in military supplies to India in its hour of crisis after the first Chinese onslaught. in October 1962. US Air Force provided massive C-130 airlifts to rush Indian Army formations to Sikkim and Arunachal.
Coming to United States strategic postures in the next China-India War, going by past historical precedent, and unfolding geopolitical environment, where United States has invested heavily in US-India Strategic Partership, analytically it can be asserted safely that the United States would adopt substantive geopolitical, strategic and military postures in support of India against China.
The manifestations of United States multi-dimensional postures in support of India will form the basis of another Paper. Suffice it to state that short of putting boots on the ground, which India would also not want, the United States could be expected to pull out all stops to assist India in its War against China.
Concluding, one cannot but observe, that if Russia is no longer a 'Strategic Asset' for India against China, and the United States can prove much more of a 'Strategic Asset' for India against China, including its vast counter-vailing power, should India now RESET ITS RUSSIA-POLICY and stop its multipolarity crusade?
Perceptional analysis would firmly indicate that the "Super Summit" between US President Joe Biden and PM Narendra Modi in Washington in end-June 2023 carries unprecedented historical significance in firmly positioning India on an ascendant power trajectory towards emerging as a Major Global Power.
Geopolitical churning, more specifically in the Indo Pacific in the last three years or so have neutralized any diffidence that may have held back both United States and India from capitalizing the full potential of their strategic and security interdependence in the Indo Pacific.
In June 2023, and the years leading to it, China has loomed large and heavily menacing in the threat perceptions of the United States and India. The intensification of the China Threat has nudged both United States and India to dispense with their respective diffidence's and add unprecedented weight and wider dimensions to the US-India Strategic Partnership.
The United States and India with obvious studied deliberation have studiously avoided designating the China Threat in their Joint Communique but it is obvious that the very premise that girds the US-India Strategic Partnership from its inception in 2000 has been the mounting concerns on the China Threat.
In the years in the run-up to June 2023, the constant assertion both by United States and India is their commitment to a "Free, Open and Secure Indo Pacific". Implicit in this assertion is that both United States and India are committed to secure the Indo Pacific---- obviously against China's coercion, aggression and predatory impulses.
The Biden-Modi "Super-Summit" and its major security-centric decisions even those in economic and science & technology domains, stand dissected widely in the media. It is not the intention in this post to repeat them but move on to the implications that arise for China thereof.
China has been heavily impacted by the burgeoning US-India Strategic Partership and especially by the slew of Basic Foundational Security Agreements that have been signed by both countries. These place India virtually as a Major NATO Plis Ally with access to advanced military hardware and technology transfers.
China was rattled beyond reason as evidenced by critical official observations even before PM Modi departed for the Washinton State Visit. China warned India not to become a 'US tool for containment of China'.
So, to begin the examination of implications of the major security-centric decisions of Biden-Modi Super-Summit, it is pertinent to highlight that China fears that the endgame of United States and India in coming decades is the Virtual "Containment of China".
Be that as it may, China in 2013 acutely perceives that the 'Balance of Power' in the Indo Pacific has tilted away from China's favor. The strengthening of the QUAD, the AUKUS Accords, and the return of the Philippines to the US-led security architecture are some examples.
The United States was for decades the predominant Power dominating the Western Pacific. India's entry into the Western Pacific largely as part of PM Modi's 'Act East' policy has added heavy "strategic ballast to United States strategic predominance.
United States with India in tow now have widened the security dimensions from Asia Pacific to Indo Pacific. This in a strategic manner outflanks China's thrusts in the Middle East.
United States granting India access to advanced US military systems, technology systems, joint development and joint production of jet engines for military aircraft significantly reduces China's asymmetric military superiority over India.
Geopolitically, evident since 2020 is that India can no longer be subjected to political and military coercion by China which had accustomed to doing so prior to 2014.
China will now have to factor-in likely United States responses to any Chinese military aggression against India in the future notwithstanding the absence of a Mutual Security Treaty.
Concluding, it can be summed-up that the major outcome of the Biden-Modi June 2023 Summit is that it places India firmly on an ascendant power trajectory to Major Global Power status.
Worth recalling is that China today figuring as a Major Threat in threat perceptions of India and United States with pretentions of being a Superpower gained 'Power Status' ironically assisted by the United States.
The United States-India Strategic Partnership whose inception took place in 2000 has in 2023 evolved into a Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership which in form and substance today is a "Quasi-Military Alliance" transcending the dimensions of a mere Strategic Partnership.
The only difference between a Formal Military Alliance and "Quasi-Military Alliance" is that a Formal Military Alliance is defined by a formal 'Security Treaty' and a "Quasi-Military Alliance" incorporates a set of defence and security cooperation agreements without an over-arching Formal Security Treaty.
In both cases, a formal or quasi-military alliance, the objective is to cater for security cooperation against a 'Common Perceived Threat'. In a formal military alliance, the perceived threat is spelt out in terms of 'capabilities and intentions'.
In a "Quasi-Military Alliance" the 'Perceived Threat' may be spelt out 'explicitly' or 'implicitly' forms the basis of a set of defense and security agreements.
The US-India Comprehensive Special Global Partnership when examined in light of the above parameters deucedly falls into the category of a "Quasi-Military Alliance" both in the bilateral context and also in the multilateral context.
The common perceived threat in the bilateral context is the 'China Threat' which has manifested itself unambiguously in the Indo Pacific against India and the United States.
In the multilateral context, countries extending from South Korea, Japan and Australia too perceive the 'China Threat' directly as impacting on their national security interests.
When viewed as an integrated whole in relation to the 'China Threat' in Indo Pacific, the security template that has emerged in 2023 in the IndoPacific is a set of bilateral security alliances between United States and South Korea, Japan and Australia and the bilateral US-India Comprehensive Special Global Partnership. Additionally, India has bilateral Strategic partnership agreements with Japan, Australia and South Korea.
Superimposed on the above security template in Indo Pacific are multilateral security groups like the QUAD Security Initiative comprising United States, Japan, India & Australia and AUKUS comprising USA, UK &Australia.
With NATO also perceiving the 'China Threat' to NATO's Southern Flank and with Major European Powers asserting their "stakes" in Indo Pacific security, an Eastern NATO is a possibility that now hovers over the horizon, and this was discussed in my last Paper.
Concluding, it needs to be noted with serious emphasis that however Indian foreign policy planners disavow military alliances, the stark reality in 2023 and likely to be reinforced by unfolding events in IndoPacific is that the 'China Threat' has nudged India into a "Quasi-Military Alliance" with the United States.
Semantics aside, this is the whole truth and for India's strategic and security good. India needs to position itself securely in a heavily polarized Bipolar World which does not offer India bandwidth to indulge in shibboleths like non-Alignment 2.0 or Multipolarity.
China needs to blame itself for hastening the likelihood of an 'Eastern NATO' emerging as NATO-type security alliance in Western Pacific in response to its persistent warmongering over Taiwan and its aggression in South China Sea.
The likelihood of an Eastern NATO coming into existence figured spasmodically in global strategic analyses for last three decades. These speculative analyses were directly related to the intensity of the 'China Threat' perceived by the Nations of the Western Pacific and the United States as the Net Security Provider of the Region.
The China Threat intensity in 2023 has started to figure alarmingly in threat perceptions of United States and its key Allies in Western Pacific, namely, Japan and South Korea.
In response to China Threat assuming threatening proportions the United States under three Presidents has pivoted back to Indo Pacific security in a hyper-active posture--- reinforcing security ties with Japan & South Korea, reclaiming Philippines in its security fold and enlarging its erstwhile US Pacific Command to US Indo Pacific Command, recognizing the significance of the Indian Ocean and India to Western Pacific security.
Contextually, United States reviving the QUAD in 2017 and thereafter forging AUKUS has to be seen in the above context.
In tandem, the China Theat started figuring as a 'Threat Perception' in NATO planning. In NATO Document 'NATO Blueprint 2030' China found mention as a 'Threat' more specifically to NATO'S Southern Flank and East Mediterranean.
NATO'S Major Members like France, UK and Germany have legitimate security interests in Indian Ocean security and in South China Sea being contested by China.
In the above perspective, NATO Secretary General had visited Japan and South Korea some months back for high level consultations.
Japan and South Korea have been invited to attend NATO Vilnius Summit later this year along with Australia and New Zealand.
NATO therefore opening a 'Liaison & Coordination Office' in Tokyo and Japan willing to host NATO Liaison & Coordination Office in its capital significantly indicates that there is a growing synergy between NATO, a Euro-centric Security Alliance with the US Security Architecture in Western Pacific.
Opening of a NATO Liaison & Coordination Office in Tokyo would facilitate closer coordination between NATO and Japan and South Korea. To this could be added Philippines too based on recent indicators.
China has reacted sharply to this development and the growing strategic proximity of Japan and South Korea after decades of mistrust.
Could this be the harbinger of an 'Eastern NATO' coming into existence? The present development is pregnant with such a possibility.
Concluding, it needs to be stressed that NATOs more intense linkages with Western Pacific Allies of United States adds one more significant layer to the US-led extended deterrence against the looming China Threat in Indo Pacific.
