Thursday, January 20, 2022

JAPAN AS FRONTLINE STATE FOR UNITED STATES IN WESTERN PACIFIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE-2022 REVIEW

Japan's National Security threat perceptions in 2022 are overwhelmingly dominated by the China Threat which has emerged as an unprecedented menacing and predatory threat posed by Communist China to Indo Pacific security surpassing in potency the Soviet Threat that hovered during Cold War 1.0.

Japan's natural choice to ensure its national survival against the Soviet Threat earlier and now the more aggressive China Threat lay with the United States. This was achieved through the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty which also facilitated US Military Forces to be positioned in Japan as US Forward Military Presence numbering over 40,000.

The United States despite having imposed a Peace Constitution on Japan after World War II limiting Japan's security to Self Defense Forces, soon realized, that not only security of the Japanese Mainland but also the overall security of  Continental USA rested on Japan as the pivotal component of US-configured security architecture in the Western Pacific, earlier against the Soviet Threat and in the 21st Century against the much more potent China Threat.

During Cold War 1.0 against the Soviet Threat, the Japanese Self Defense Forces were incrementally made to share the security of sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) extending to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan across the South China Sea expanse. Denial of Japanese Straits for Soviet submarines to breakout into the Pacific was also a major task.

The enormity of the China Threat to Western Pacific security, Japan's security per se, and to Continental USA that has unfolded in the first decade of the 21st Century has prompted the United States to shed its earlier misgivings about re-emergence of Japanese militarism (fostered by China and lapped up by US), has now given way to the United States even encouraging Japan to acquire offensive and Force Projection capabilities for Japanese Armed Forces.

Japan today is engaged in a sustained drive in the above direction. Reports also indicate of the conversion of the two Helicopter Carriers of Japanese Navy into mini- Aircraft Carriers to operate F-35s. Missile ranges are also being doubled.

Japan is actively participating in joint patrolling of the South China Sea and capacity-building of Navies of Vietnam and the Philippines besides investing in the security of other South East Asian countries perceiving the China Threat.

Japan is an active member of QUAD and has forged substantive defence relationships with India and Australia--all supplementing the overall effort of securing the Indo Pacific against Chinese expansionism.

Concluding, all that one can emphasize is that Japan in face of the China Threat menacing the security of Indo Pacific Region has emerged even more distinctively as the most pivotal component of the US-configured security architecture not only for the Western Pacific but even for the overall  Indo Pacific Security architecture to checkmate the China Threat. Japan today is involved in that direction with United States, India and Australia---with European Nations also pitching in now.


 

Friday, January 14, 2022

JAPAN-AUSTRALIA DEFENCE AGREEMENT :Deterrence Noose Tightens Against China

Ominously, the recently signed Japan-Australia Defence Agreement 2021 portends the tightening of the Strategic Deterrence noose against China both in terms of their strategic weight and also that yet an additional layer is added over and to the Indo Pacific security architecture led by the United States.

Japan and Australia are Major Powers of the Indo Pacific strategically located in the Northern and Southern segments of the Pacific Ocean. The strategic weight of Japan in Indo Pacific security arises from their long-standing durability as enduring Allies of the United States through the decades-old US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States Alliance).

Additionally, Japan and Australia are members of the QUAD Security Initiative and Australia recently became member of AUKUS comprising Australia, UK and US-- the three member Nuclear Submarines Alliance, with planned transfer of US nuclear submarines technology to Australia.

In 2022, the geopolitical picture obtaining is that Japan and Australia intensely perceive the China Threat  as a strategic concern for their respective national security interests. Both Japan and Australia in recent ears have been at the receiving end of China's political and economic coercion.

China has in recent years been making determined forays into Southern Pacific smaller island nations over which Australia had enjoyed strategic influence.

Logically therefore, it was natural for Japan and Australia to establish a strong Defence Partnership providing complimentary security weightage to each other bilaterally,  over and above, their respective security treaties with United States.

Japan and Australia can now be expected to intensify their military exchanges and joint exercises to cater for contingencies arising in the Western Pacific because of China's depredations in South China Sea, threats of Taiwan invasion and meddling in South Est Asia. Japan and Australia share strategic convergences on these aspects.

Japan-Australia Bilateral Defence Agreement needs to be strategically viewed as an insurance by both countries to cater for any contingency of an unlikely isolationist impulses that sometimes afflict the United States polity.

Concluding,in terms of overall Indo Pacific Security Template the Japan-Australia Defence Agreement besides adding another weighty strand to the web of security relationships that have emerged as "Strategic Deterrence" to China's threatening postures in the Indo Pacific also portends and signals the 'firm intentions'  of United States, Japan, Australia and India to deter China in different combinations from its wanton aggressive impulses. 

Thursday, December 30, 2021

CHINA AGREES TO ESTABLISH MILITARY HOTLINE WITH JAPAN AMID RISING TENSIONS

In a marked change from China's stances for last ten years of dithering and responding firmly in establishing a military hotline between Beijing and Tokyo, on December 27 2021 after a two hour video conference between Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi and Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, it was announced that both countries had agreed to establish the hotline before end of 2022.

Analytically, China's changed stance arises from increased military tensions between China and Japan over Chinese military provocations not only around the Japanese Senkaku Islands in East China Sea which China claims but also in Chinese submarines prowling around in Japanese waters.

Japan has retaliated to China's increasing military provocations by substantially increasing its defense budget, shifting the weight of Japanese military deployments southwards, increase in its offensive punch of its weapons systems and anti-ballistic missiles systems.

China's current strategic concerns on Japan's increasing military profile transcends seemingly into the geopolitical domains also where Japan has lately taken strong positions over China's threats of military invasion of Taiwan.

More than the above, what seems to have rattled China was the strong postures that Japan has taken over the Taiwan issue in asserting that it is seriously concerned with China's escalating of military tensions in the Taiwan Straits.

Indicative of the above were also media reports suggesting that Japan would actively side with any United States military actions that were aimed to deter China from a military invasion of Taiwan.

Reading in between the lines, one can conclude that the above virtually amounts to Japan not subscribing to China's 'One China' formulation and that Taiwan is a part of China.

On another plane, China's willingness to establish a military hotline with Japan may be arising from Chinese calculations that by setting up a direct hotline with Tokyo, it could possibly open up direct lines of communication with Japan m independent of United States.

Concluding, whatever be the current compulsions of China to finally set up a military hotline with Japan, one thing is certain and that is that Japan would not succumb to Chinese overtures to wean away Japan from the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty  which covers under Article 5 contingencies that may arise over Senkaku Islands and Taiwan too.


Analytically, China's changed stance on the desirability of establ a military hotline with Tokyo arises from increase military tensions between China and Japan over  

Monday, December 20, 2021

UNITED STATES UNDER SCRUTINY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON INDO PACIFIC SECURITY COMMITMENTS - DECEMBER 2021

 On the verge of he year 2022, major Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand pereceptionally seem to be either unsure of United States commitments on Indo Pacific security or overly weighed down by China's potential displeasure on South East Asia tilting towards United States. The latter fear arising from China generating domestic conflict in these countries.

In the last two years, the United States has given a lead in the revival of the US-led QUAD Security Initiative which now is active with participation of Major Powers of Indo Pacific, namely India, Japan and Australia. The QUAD undeniably is China-centric deterrence in manifestation.

In yet another strategic assertion aimed at deterrence of China and imposing potentially nuclear "Dissuasion" on China's propensity for disruptive military adventurism in Indo Pacific, the United States this year also set up the AUKUS comprising Australia, UK and US. AUKUS is potentially nuclear deterrence in play against China.

In tandem Major Powers of NATO like France and UK have lately been vocally and assertively veering towards more active roles in Indo Pacific security contributing and supplementing the overall efforts of the 'Arc of Democracies', so aptly named by Former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, to impose deterrence on China.

Against this backdrop, it is surprising that South East Asia countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand should still be uncertain on US resolve to honour its commitments to underwrite Indo Pacific security.

Aware of this strategic wavering and fear of China's strategic reverberations on tilting towards US-led  security mechanisms, the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken recently undertook a three nation tour of South East Asia beginning with Indonesia and follow-up visits to Malaysia and Thailand.

It was in Indonesia, the largest and influential ASEAN Nations that US Secretary of State Blinken made the strongest reiteration of United States security commitments to Indo Pacific security. China by name was cautioned against its predatory military adventurism.

Understandably, Indonesia and Malaysia, with sizable Chinese expatriate Chinese communities in their midst and Indonesia having suffered widespread racial riots in the past should be wary of being perceived by China as joining the US-led posse' against China.

Partly, these South East Asian nations uncertainty on US-resolve to guarantee  Indo Pacific security may be arising from United States demonstrated historical pattern from US unceremonious military exit from Vietnam, US shying away from confronting China in its South China Sea depredations in initial stages, and the strategic ambiguity on defence of Taiwan currently the target of China's political and military coercion.

In order that Indo Pacific Region, and specifically, the wavering South East Asia nations, rallies around US-led Indo Pacific security initiatives to deter China, strategic imperatives exist for United States to demonstrate by assertions by US President and by demonstrated actions by use of visible US military power in confronting China. 


Wednesday, December 1, 2021

RUSSIA MUST NOT BE ON WRONG SIDE OF HISTORY IN INDO PACIFIC 2021

Russia as an erstwhile Superpower and with aspirations to re-emerge as an alternative global power centre regrettably stands out on the wrong side of history in Indo Pacific security environment in 2021. Notably so, because Russia is perceived to be siding with China which has polarized the entire Indo Pacific against it.

The entire Indo Pacific vast expanse from Japan to India and from South Korea to Australia is geopolitically and strategically ranged against China because of its propensity to use military force on its peripheries to impose the Chinese writ.

In the highly polarized Indo Pacific security environment where the United States has been successful in rallying China-beleaguered Nations to align with it in countervailing security mechanisms against China like QUAD and AUKUS, surely, Russia should be asking itself questions of re-setting an exit the Russia-China strategic nexus? from

Russia far far too long has subordinated its own global strategic stature to China's strategic aims, more out of expediency rather than Russia's national security interests. Can Russia afford to continue this trend any further in the emerging Indo Pacific security environment?

China's military arrogance arising from past US timid responses against China's South China Sea depredations has emboldened China now to challenge United States over its plans to annex Taiwan by use of military force.

The above scenario inherently has the potential to ignite an armed conflict between China and the United States. Chinese military brinkmanship may not wot work any longer.

Russia in the above conflictual scenario would be in a serious strategic dilemma. Should it align with China militarily against the United States-led coalitions like QUAD and AUKUS which may then emerge  more actively assertive?

Would Russia as an alternative opt for being a passive spectator and let a US-China armed conflict play out to its logical conclusion?

In both cases Russia would perceptionally lose out to being on the wrong side of history in terms of its strategic stature and standing in the Indo Pacific. All of this for the single reason because of its strategic alignment with an aggressive China perceived as a 'Revisionist Power' bent on challenging the established world order,

Russia desperately needs serious course-corrections in its strategic policy formulations.