FRANCE AND INDIA SHARE GSIGNIFICANT STRATEIC CONVERGENCES ON CHINA THREAT TO INDO PACIFIC SECURITY

The China Threat to Indo Pacific security and stability has implicitly been taken cognizance of by France and India during the recent September 2022 visit of French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonne to New Delhi. Going by the assertive statements made on imperatives of a 'Free & Open IndoPacific' the strategic convergences indicate that both France and India intend intensifying jointly their strategic cooperation towards Indo Pacific security. 

Notably, unlike India, which is a late entrant into the domain of Indo Pacific security, France has a military presence in both the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean on its island territories in terms of military, naval and air bases.

France based on Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean garrisons has at its command appreciable intelligence acquisition and force projection capabilities in both these Oceans.

France is the only major European Power to have the above capabilities in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

The above contextually becomes vital especially in the South Pacific Islands nations where China's intrusive presence is adding yet another strategic concern to Indo Pacific security.

India on the other hand is a Member Nation of the US-led Quadrilateral Security Initiative comprising United States, Japan, Australia and India. 

The QUAD is for all practical purposes a 'China-Deterrent' security grouping despite QUAD other members deferring to Indian hedging on naming the China Threat by applying non-security labels.

France like India has crafted a web of bilateral security relationships with countries in the Indo Pacific in addition to India like Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand.

Superimposing the French and Indian templates of security relationships the Indo Pacific on each other, what emerges is a mosaic of over-lapping convergences between France and India on Indo Pacific security which can contribute handsomely to the existing US-led security architecture.

In relation to the China Threat, the same now   figures in European Union and NATO perspectives of which France is a member.

 Significant scope therefore lies for both France and India in intensification of their Strategic Partnership with strong convergences on Indo Pacific security and stability.

 

 

INDIA'S STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES TO VIEW R USSIA AND CHINATHROUGH RUSSIA-CHINA AXIS PRISM

India's policy establishment in 2022 has to grapple with the challenge that in terms of policy planning it now has to base its foreign policy perspectives on the emerged reality of the Russia-China Axis as a power bloc in direct confrontation with the Global Democracies headed by the United States and includes India.

Reflecting on this aspect was an assertion made by me in an analytical piece in Eurasia Review onSeptember 1 2022 on the evolving Cold War 2.0 polarised environment, isxna AThe intensifiction of the Russia-Chiisxna Axis andia its implications for Ind

 The most significant points made in this Analysis were 

• Russia and China cannot be the vectors of Indian foreign policy."
• "Inia cannot be on wrong side of global geopolitics and global polarization."
• "During Cold War 2.0 India will have no bandwidth to revel in tadeonal foreign policy shibboleths of Non-Alignment, Non-Alignment, or Strategic Autonomy."
•  "India should not send confusing signals to Global Democracies that it still has lingering affections for the Russia-China Axis."

India can no longer strategically afford to base its policy perspectives on Russia and China as two separate entities but adopt the policy planning prism of the Russia-China Axis as a "Geopolitical Whole" and a   'Strategic Whole'.  

No further proof is required of Rusia-China Axis having been operationalized than the Rusia-China Axis in play on India's doorsteps in South Asia marginalizing India on Afghanistan furthering China's and Pakistan's strategic interests.

Russia's policy profile in the last five years amply denotes that when Russia will be faced to make choices between respecting China's strategic sensitivities and India's strategic sensitivities, Russia would unhesitatingly side with China.

Russia would accord priority to Russia-China Axis strategic objectives in relation to its overall confrontation with United States led Global Democracies than to honor India's lingering strategic obsession that Russia would at best stay neutral.

India opting for 'virtual alignment with Global Democracies' in terms of Indo Pacific security mechanisms does not require amplification. What requires amplification is that India has to make tough choices of openly asserting its strategic preferences and choices.

If Indian PM Modi has boldly shed all the shibboleths of India's Nehruvian foreign policy what holds PM Modi with his indomitable outlook to "DECOUPLE" India from India's self-imposed Russian manacles?

India's intentions, other than 'Risk Aversion' instincts of Nehruvian hangovers lingering in Indian foreign policy establishment, seem to drive India's lingering attachment to Russia despite Russia making its intentions clear on the concretizing of the Russia-China Axis.

Concluding, it needs forceful emphasis that Inda's rise to a Major Global Player can only be facilitated by the Major Powers of Global Democracies and not by Russia and certainly not China and the Russia-China Axis. So why India's diffidence in terms of unambiguous assertion of its strategic preferences and directions?