CHINA AGREES TO ESTABLISH MILITARY HOTLINE WITH JAPAN AMID RISING TENSIONS

In a marked change from China's stances for last ten years of dithering and responding firmly in establishing a military hotline between Beijing and Tokyo, on December 27 2021 after a two hour video conference between Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi and Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, it was announced that both countries had agreed to establish the hotline before end of 2022.

Analytically, China's changed stance arises from increased military tensions between China and Japan over Chinese military provocations not only around the Japanese Senkaku Islands in East China Sea which China claims but also in Chinese submarines prowling around in Japanese waters.

Japan has retaliated to China's increasing military provocations by substantially increasing its defense budget, shifting the weight of Japanese military deployments southwards, increase in its offensive punch of its weapons systems and anti-ballistic missiles systems.

China's current strategic concerns on Japan's increasing military profile transcends seemingly into the geopolitical domains also where Japan has lately taken strong positions over China's threats of military invasion of Taiwan.

More than the above, what seems to have rattled China was the strong postures that Japan has taken over the Taiwan issue in asserting that it is seriously concerned with China's escalating of military tensions in the Taiwan Straits.

Indicative of the above were also media reports suggesting that Japan would actively side with any United States military actions that were aimed to deter China from a military invasion of Taiwan.

Reading in between the lines, one can conclude that the above virtually amounts to Japan not subscribing to China's 'One China' formulation and that Taiwan is a part of China.

On another plane, China's willingness to establish a military hotline with Japan may be arising from Chinese calculations that by setting up a direct hotline with Tokyo, it could possibly open up direct lines of communication with Japan m independent of United States.

Concluding, whatever be the current compulsions of China to finally set up a military hotline with Japan, one thing is certain and that is that Japan would not succumb to Chinese overtures to wean away Japan from the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty  which covers under Article 5 contingencies that may arise over Senkaku Islands and Taiwan too.

Analytically, China's changed stance on the desirability of establ a military hotline with Tokyo arises from increase military tensions between China and Japan over  

UNITED STATES UNDER SCRUTINY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON INDO PACIFIC SECURITY COMMITMENTS - DECEMBER 2021

 On the verge of he year 2022, major Southeast Asian nations like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand pereceptionally seem to be either unsure of United States commitments on Indo Pacific security or overly weighed down by China's potential displeasure on South East Asia tilting towards United States. The latter fear arising from China generating domestic conflict in these countries.

In the last two years, the United States has given a lead in the revival of the US-led QUAD Security Initiative which now is active with participation of Major Powers of Indo Pacific, namely India, Japan and Australia. The QUAD undeniably is China-centric deterrence in manifestation.

In yet another strategic assertion aimed at deterrence of China and imposing potentially nuclear "Dissuasion" on China's propensity for disruptive military adventurism in Indo Pacific, the United States this year also set up the AUKUS comprising Australia, UK and US. AUKUS is potentially nuclear deterrence in play against China.

In tandem Major Powers of NATO like France and UK have lately been vocally and assertively veering towards more active roles in Indo Pacific security contributing and supplementing the overall efforts of the 'Arc of Democracies', so aptly named by Former Japanese PM Shinzo Abe, to impose deterrence on China.

Against this backdrop, it is surprising that South East Asia countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand should still be uncertain on US resolve to honour its commitments to underwrite Indo Pacific security.

Aware of this strategic wavering and fear of China's strategic reverberations on tilting towards US-led  security mechanisms, the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken recently undertook a three nation tour of South East Asia beginning with Indonesia and follow-up visits to Malaysia and Thailand.

It was in Indonesia, the largest and influential ASEAN Nations that US Secretary of State Blinken made the strongest reiteration of United States security commitments to Indo Pacific security. China by name was cautioned against its predatory military adventurism.

Understandably, Indonesia and Malaysia, with sizable Chinese expatriate Chinese communities in their midst and Indonesia having suffered widespread racial riots in the past should be wary of being perceived by China as joining the US-led posse' against China.

Partly, these South East Asian nations uncertainty on US-resolve to guarantee  Indo Pacific security may be arising from United States demonstrated historical pattern from US unceremonious military exit from Vietnam, US shying away from confronting China in its South China Sea depredations in initial stages, and the strategic ambiguity on defence of Taiwan currently the target of China's political and military coercion.

In order that Indo Pacific Region, and specifically, the wavering South East Asia nations, rallies around US-led Indo Pacific security initiatives to deter China, strategic imperatives exist for United States to demonstrate by assertions by US President and by demonstrated actions by use of visible US military power in confronting China. 

RUSSIA MUST NOT BE ON WRONG SIDE OF HISTORY IN INDO PACIFIC 2021

Russia as an erstwhile Superpower and with aspirations to re-emerge as an alternative global power centre regrettably stands out on the wrong side of history in Indo Pacific security environment in 2021. Notably so, because Russia is perceived to be siding with China which has polarized the entire Indo Pacific against it.

The entire Indo Pacific vast expanse from Japan to India and from South Korea to Australia is geopolitically and strategically ranged against China because of its propensity to use military force on its peripheries to impose the Chinese writ.

In the highly polarized Indo Pacific security environment where the United States has been successful in rallying China-beleaguered Nations to align with it in countervailing security mechanisms against China like QUAD and AUKUS, surely, Russia should be asking itself questions of re-setting an exit the Russia-China strategic nexus? from

Russia far far too long has subordinated its own global strategic stature to China's strategic aims, more out of expediency rather than Russia's national security interests. Can Russia afford to continue this trend any further in the emerging Indo Pacific security environment?

China's military arrogance arising from past US timid responses against China's South China Sea depredations has emboldened China now to challenge United States over its plans to annex Taiwan by use of military force.

The above scenario inherently has the potential to ignite an armed conflict between China and the United States. Chinese military brinkmanship may not wot work any longer.

Russia in the above conflictual scenario would be in a serious strategic dilemma. Should it align with China militarily against the United States-led coalitions like QUAD and AUKUS which may then emerge  more actively assertive?

Would Russia as an alternative opt for being a passive spectator and let a US-China armed conflict play out to its logical conclusion?

In both cases Russia would perceptionally lose out to being on the wrong side of history in terms of its strategic stature and standing in the Indo Pacific. All of this for the single reason because of its strategic alignment with an aggressive China perceived as a 'Revisionist Power' bent on challenging the established world order,

Russia desperately needs serious course-corrections in its strategic policy formulations.