UNITED STATES PRESIDENT TRUMP 2:0 CHINA STRATEGY: RISK AVERSION OR LULL BEFORE THE STORM?

President Trump in his second term has yet to unfold the precise contours of his 'China Strategy' excepting some conciliatory moves in run-up to his re-election and some notional increase in tariffs. This leads to the crucial question whether President Trump 2:0 is going to revert to long-practiced US 'Risk Aversion' China strategies or is this a 'Lull before the Storm'? 

In an earlier Article, I had surmised that President Trump would await to see how his Russia-tilt policy would pan out, before he makes his moves on China.

China Risk Aversion Strategy: Can President Trump Afford This in 2025 Geopolitical Scenario?

'China Hedging' and 'Risk Aversion' American strategies were discarded by President Trump in his first term.

President Trump launched Trade Wars against China and in tandem ordered in 2017 the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FNOPS) in which US Navy ships carried out maneuvers in South China Sea whose sovereignty China claimed.

In 2017, President Trump also pro-actively resuscitated the QUAD Security Initiative dormant since 2008. This was a significant political messaging to China.

President Biden's Administration 2020-24 unexpectedly outdid President Trump in continuing American 'Hard- Line' strategy against China.

In 2025 for over a decade, the National Security Strategy documents, the consensus amongst US Senators and Congressman on Capitol Hill and US general public opinion view the China Threat as the Prime Threat to US national security interests and US global influence.

In view of the above factors, geopolitical and strategic logic would leave no political bandwidth to adopt Risk Aversion strategies in relation to China. Even President Trump's MAGA obsession would dictate neutralization of China.

United States-China Stances 2025: The Lull Before the Storm? 

If Risk Aversion strategies against Chuna is not a geopolitical option for President Trump and not a politically wise option in terms of domestic public opinion, then the only viable option for President Trump is to persist in 'Hard -Line' strategies towards China adopted by United States both in Trump 1:0 Administration and Biden Administration, preceding Trump 2:0 Administration.

Why has President Trump in the first sixty days of his second term does not demonstrate any 'Hard-Line' approaches against China when he has adopted unprecedented harshness against NATO Allies in Europe and Ukraine?

The above was seemingly adopted as a measure to reinforce credentials of his 'Russia-tilt' opening strategy which global analysts term it as 'Reverse Kissinger' moves.

Russia even after two months of President Trump's tilt has not responded positively and in equal measure to President Trump's opening geopolitical gambit.

The logical deduction from the above is that Russia is averse to any changes in the "No Limits" strategic nexus with China and committed to the Russia-China Axis as a counterweight to American global predominance.

President Trump now faces in 2025, the challenges faced by United States in the last two decades of a Russia-China Axis posing a 'Dual Threat' in Western Pacific and in Europe.

United States decision in 2025 to reduce US Military Forces in Europe and redeploy them in Western Pacific against China Threat makes military sense. But in tandem President Trump will have to revise his antagonizing stances against NATO Allies in Europe.

President Trump has lost some measure of "Credibility of American Security Guarantees" after abandoning Ukraine to win over Russia.

China as a result of the above gets "emboldened" in Western Pacific to test 'American Credibility" in terms of US security guarantees to protect Taiwan against Chinese Military Invasion and political and military coercion of Japan and the Philippines.

President Trump is in a piquant strategic dilemma, therefore, where any intensification of Trade Wars with China and imposing sanctions on China would not deter China from aggressive military brinkmanship against Taiwan, US Allies like Japan and US security architecture in Western Pacific.

Surely, the import would not be lost on President Trump of recent intensification of Russia-China Axis military moves like large scale Joint Exercises in Western Pacific and Joint Russian- Chinese Combat Air Patrols in vicinity of Japan and even US Bases in Alaska.

Concluding Observations

US President Trump has to face the grim reality that Russia-China Axis will be in full play in Asia Pacific to challenge American predominance.

The above does not afford any strategic bandwidth for President Trump to arrive at any 'Singular Deal' with China to break-out of the gridlock or offer any other US 'geopolitical sweeteners' to China which perceptionally will be viewed by Asia Pacific as a President Trump capitulation.

Strategic logic would dictate that President Trump to uphold the majesty of United States predominance in the Pacific against China's predatory moves would be left with no option other than to "Militarily Challenge China in Asia Pacific " and dispel the Russia-China Axis notion, and more specifically China's strategic perceptions, that United States would prefer 'Risk Aversion' strategy against China rather than a square military confrontation.

The Asia Pacific is today facing a "Lull Before the Storm" in terms of a United States-China Military Confrontation. 

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 of office 2016-20.

UNITED STATES CONFUSING ITS ALLIES AND STRATEGIC PARTNERS WITH PRESIDENT TRUMP 2:0 POLICY STANCES 2025

Global geopolitics have been thrown into uncertainties and uncharted waters by US President Trump 2:0 policy stances and reckless assertions by top US personages leaving United States longstanding Allies and its 'Strategic Partners' confused.

In the pervading geopolitical milieu wherein United States predominance is under a severe pushback by the Russia-China Axis, can the United States be oblivious to the strategic sensitivities of its Allies and Strategic Partner

NATO and Trans-Atlantic unity and solidarity have been seriously dented by US Vice President Vance and Defence Secretary reckless assertions at recent Munich Security Conference and thereafter.

The incendiary faceoff by Ukrainian President Zelensky at the White House with President Trump and Vice President Vance and United States tilt towards Russian demands on Ukraine peace was not only bad optics but generated perceptions that United States is no longer committed to European Security and has abandoned Ukraine which for all practical purposes was fighting a Proxy War for the United States. 

Moving to Asia Pacific where ever since 1945 Japan has been a steadfast US Ally, US President Trump heaped 'Trade Tariffs ' on Japan. The United States forgets that Japan pays handsomely for US Military Forces stationed in Japan.

India which has evolved into a 'Robust Strategic Partner' in the US-India Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was publicly threatened with imposition of US Trade Tariffs.

Trade Wars and Trade Tariffs may be a good weapon for use against hostile States like Russia and China, but not against Allies and Strategic Partners.

Such American dismissiveness of US Allies and Strategic Partners has never been witnessed before. Differences in opinion have occurred in the past but were ironed out by 'discreet negotiations' away from public gaze so as not to threaten Allies/Strategic Partners solidarity.

Does the United States really believe that it can retain its global predominance solely on its own economic, military and diplomatic strengths?

Not so really!! 

The mainstays of US global predominance ever since the disintegration of Former USSR and China Threat emerging as the 'Prime Threat to US security' rested on United States military postures in Europe and Asia Pacific and on the cumulative strengths of its European and Asia Pacific Allies,

The United States 'singularly' is not geared today geopolitically in 2025 to dispense with its dependence on United States European Alles and its Asia Pacific Allies. 

Similarly, the United States can ill-afford to antagonize India by threats of Trade Tariffs and sanctions which may be relevant in terms oof Russia and China.

Reflected in my Book: "China India Military Confrontation: 21st Century Perspectives" (2015) was the assertion that in the evolving geopolitical scenarios' United Staes embedment in Asia would be squarely dependent on India adding 'Strategic Ballast' to United States' security architecture against the China Threat.

India has many other geopolitical options other than the United Sates. The United States has India 'ONLY' as the Credible Option against China Threat in the years to come. 

Concluding, one needs to highlight how Asian perceptions of the United States have drastically changed in 2025. Singapore has been a longstanding reliable Ally of the United States and the statement made by Singapore Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen at the Munich Security Conference 2025, as reported by South China Morning Post of February 17 2025  reflects sadly and regrettably Asia's changed perceptions of the United States in 2025.

The Singapore Defense Minister asserted that" The image (of United States) has changed from Liberator to Great Disruptor, to a Landlord Seeking Rent." 

The above assertion from one of United States most notable Asian Ally came in a prepared statement posted also on the Government website, as per South China Morning Post dispatch.

Notably this perceptive assertion came soon after United States Trump 2:0 Administration top officials had made it clear at Munich that United States was no longer committed to European Security and abandoning Ukraine.

The big question that perceptively must be plaguing Asian capitals, and especially US Allies and Strategic Partners in Indo Pacific, would be 'If the United States could renege from its security commitments to NATO/European Security, could a similar fate await US Allies and Strategic Partners in Indo Pacific Security in context of the China Threat?' 

Hopefully not. But then it is incumbent upon US President Trump and Trump 2:0Administration seniormost security advisors to clear the geopolitical fog generated by them.

Superpowers are guarantors of global security and stability and not "Rent Collectors" for security services provided in furtherance of their own national interests.

 Munich Conference

UNITED STATES -RUSSIA-CHINA POWERPLAY 2025 WITH ADVENT OF US PRESIDENT TRUMP 2:0 & IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

   Global geopolitics and dynamics of United States-Russia-China powerplay in 2025 underwent a seismic shift with the advent of US President Trump 2:0 in Washington and under his stewardship an apparent and unprecedented American tilt towards Russia.

United States is the only country powerful enough to shape the external and internal environments of both China and Russia. To that extent, President Trump 2:0 will have its main focus on China and Russia, and the Russia-China Axis, and their threat neutralization to safeguard US national interests. 

In pursuit of the above, President Trump seems ready to accept any collateral damage to US Allies and strategic partners, 

Global reactions labelling President Trump as unpredictable, impulsive and transactional betray the lack of deeper analysis of the underpinnings of his calculated geopolitical strategies towards United States main rivals---Russia and China.

Contrary to prevailing analysts' opinion, my take is that the unpredictability, impulsiveness and apparent transactional projections of President Trump are tools of putting his opponents on the backfoot. It should not be forgotten that US Presidents in run-up to their elections devise their strategic blueprints with their top advisers.

Then what is President Trump's strategic blueprint? What is its central focus? What geopolitical trajectories are likely to be adopted? 

President Trump's blueprint has at its core the end-aim of 'Make America Great Again' (MAGA". 

The central focus of MAGA is to Re-establish United States unrivalled global geopolitical and economic predominance which for some years has been whittled by China and in recent years, more pointedly after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, the Russia-China Axis.

In 2025, China predominantly, and Russia to a lesser degree, hover menacingly in United States 'Threat Perceptions. 

The strategic trajectory that President Trump is primarily adopting is to (1) Eliminate/ diminish the China Threat to United States security interests and influence, and (2) To disrupt and diminish the Russia-China Axis.

Going by President Trump's actions and pronouncements in the last few weeks, it emerges that President Trump's first priority is to disrupt and diminish the Russia-China Axis.

On China, President Trump has yet to reveal the cards he is likely to play. Though President Trump made some conciliatory calls/statements on China, but that do not seem to be at the expense of the main aim of strategically eliminating/diminishing the China Threat to US security and its interests.

President Trump is not likely to impart overall priority to 'military containment' of China but to focus on degrading further China's sluggish economy with impact on China's defence spending thereby reducing its military adventurism and   war-waging capabilities.

This US strategy of 'Warfare by Economic Means' was first enunciated by a former US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill in a paper for a US thinktank, if I remember correctly, US Council on Foreign Relations.

Once President Trump completes his reset of Russia-policy and secures ceasefire/peace in Ukraine, giving meanwhile China time to arrive at a possible deal with United States on American terms, one can expect the American President to play his cards on China.

If China is reluctant to settle for a "Deal' on President Trump's terms, then one can expect United States 'War by Economic Means' to be put in full throttle with central focus on--- Trade Wars, Economic Sanctions, Disruption of China's Supply Chains, Technology Denials, and Flight of US Capital/ FDI from China.

In the above strategy, the 'grey area 'is as to what extent Russia will stand by China as it enters on a phase of acute confrontation with United States?

 China can be expected to escalate tensions on Taiwan/ South Chinna Sea to relieve US economic siege.

Surely, US President Trump and his policy advisers would have worked out the contingencies.

Lastly what are the implications for India in the ensuing US-Russia-China powerplay?

 India is well placed as it has had a long strategic partnership with Russia and a much more robust strategic partnership currently with the United Staes. 

United States and Russia arriving at a good relationship is beneficial for India's national interests.

United States and China relations can be forecasted to persist as adversarial/ confrontationist.  In my writings right from 2001, I have maintained that a United States-China armed conflict was inevitable. The question was not IF but WHEN? Maybe that moment is arriving soon.

In the above dismal scenario of a US-China Armed Conflict, however limited, India's foreign policy will be seriously challenged. If India shirks from taking sides with United States, then India can forget its aspirations to emerge as a Major Global Player in world geopolitics.

Concluding, my assessment is that US President Trump will attempt to inflict on China what a Former US President Ronald Reagan inflicted on the Former USSR, that is, economic disintegration as a prelude to political disintegration.

 

CHINA'S COOMMUNIST REGIME AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS PERCEPTIONALLY UNDER ASSAULT 2025

 In a rare departure from Chinese President Xi Jinping's normal exhortations on China's national security priorities, President Xi Jinping's latest exhortation perecptionally betrays apprehensions that China's Communist regime, Communist political system and Communist ideology are in 2025 under assault.

The South China Morning Post media report of last week quoted Chinese President Xi Jinping's exhortations on China's national security priorities stated: "We should safeguard the safety of the (Xi Jinping) regime, the political system, as well as ideology".

Analytically, when each of the above three components are analyzed, my earlier assessments on China's strategic vulnerabilities stand reinforced.

In 2025, Communist China after 12 years of iron-handed and highly centralized rule, President Xi Jinping betrays apprehensions that Xi Jinping's regime is not all that secure and that an exhortation was necessitated to call for "safeguarding the safety of the (Xi Jinping) regime".

President Xi Jinping apprehensions betray fears of China being externally and internally besieged, something that my writings of last five years have reflected.

Things have come to head in 2025 for President Xi Jinping where under his regime, the fundamentals of Chinese economy which propelled China's stupendous economic and military rise have lost their traction

The second national security priority exhortation made by President Xi Jinping was on safeguarding the political system. In the 75th year of establishment of Chinese Communist political system in China, President Xi Jinping may be recalling that the other Communist gigantic empire, the Former Soviet Union, disintegrated in its 75th year.

Perceptionaly, Communist political systems are no longer geopolitically in vogue in 2025. This is my considered assessment.

Surprisingly, Chinese President Xi Jining in 2025 prioritizes safeguarding of "ideology" as the third and last priority.

Analytically, the above conveys the perception that the Chinese President Xi Jinping concedes that Communist ideology in China has frayed under impact of external and internal factors.

China's teeming millions for decades under high economic affluence were permissive in accepting Communist ideological repression. Communist ideology as a palliative ceases to operate when China is entering a 'Deflation Phase' and high rates of unemployment.

Responding to the ongoing downturn, Chinese President Xi Jinping has geopolitically reined-in his 'wolf warrior diplomats', initiated political reach outs to Japan and India, and to recall and sit down for discussion with Chinse billionaires' tycoons like Jack Mia. who were earlier hounded and disgraced by President Xi Jinping

The major question that arises from the foregoing analysis is whether President Xi Jinping can bring about a "turnround" to ensure that Xi Regime can survive when both his regime and its Communist political ideological underpinnings are under assault in 2025.

Can China's Peoples Liberation Army, the mainstay of Chinese Communist Party regimes be counted upon by President Xi Jinping to protect and safeguard his regime and its ideological underpinnings? This is a strong debatable point. Depends on ideological commitment and purity of rank and file of PLA and not on loyalty of Chinese President's handpicked PLA generals.

Overall, the answers lie in the geopolitical choices that Chines President Xi Jinping makes in the complex power equations in the US-Russia-China Triangle, and on which is also dependent China's economic resilience.

Summing-it up, Chinese President Xi Jinping's implicit apprehensions of regime-change, says it all and encapsulates the strategic vulnerabilities of Communist China in 2025.

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDERPINNINGS 2025 AMIDST GLOBALGEOPOLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES

China's foreign policy underpinnings in 2025 as China faces increasingly global geopolitical uncertainties cannot but be a reflection of Chinese President Xi Jinping's struggle to inject resilience in China's foreign policy when China stands both externally and internally besieged.

Contextually, China faces major imponderables in 2025 as it braces to navigate through the choppy waters of global uncertainties. 

These can be briefly spelt out as: (1) US-Russia relations in wake of US President Trump bailing out President Putin on Ukraine (2) President Trump consequently can be expected to press home the advantage by driving a wedge in the Russia-China Axis (3) China's geopolitical irrelevance in Middle East and Europe generated in 2024, can it be retrieved? (4) President Trump launching a new round of Trade Wars on China coupled with pivoting US Military Forces in Europe to Asia Pacific.

The first three factors have the potential to reduce China's global geopolitical weightage and the leverages it has enjoyed so far on the global stage courtesy both Russia and United States.

China seems confident presently that US President Trump will not be able to dilute or cause a serious breach in the Russia-China Axis. May be so, but as posted by me earlier on this site, a somewhat strategic denouement was creeping in.

The fourth factor stated above will damage China's unsuccessful attempts of China's economic recovery and compound China's growing social unrest as a result of high unemployment rates and loss of foreign investors' confidence in China's economic resurgence.

President Trump despite a conciliatory call to Chinese President soon on assuming office can be expected to adopt even more 'Hard Line' strategies towards China, than even his earlier term. .

In the imponderables outlined above, China's national security, and continuance of Chinese Communist Party's supremacy, is the bedrock of China's foreign policy, get impacted.  How China configures its foreign policy to meet these eventualities has yet to unfold.

China would not be overly worried about diversion of greater US Military Forces to Asia Pacific but would be certainly concerned over US efforts to dilute the Russia-China Axis.

Economic security which forms the second pillar of China's foreign policy has already acquired threatening contours for China.

China today is plagued with a stagnant economy said to be entering a 'deflationary phase', growing unemployment and with consequent domestic social unrest. China's exports are slowing with increased loss of investor confidence and flight of capital reducing China's economic resilience.

What are the options open for China's foreign policy in 2025? It can push-back United States military and economic pressures or accept a "US Deal" on President Trump's terms?

China's push-back against US military and economic pressures would require Russia's unstinted support. This now emerges as an imponderable and would depend on Russian President Putin's pay-back contours, to President Trump for bailing him out of the Ukraine morass.

In the triangular United States-Russia-China power-play what has been a constant is a severe 'Strategic Distrust' in US-China relations whereas as I have posted earlier that some strategic denouement has crept in Russia-China relations.

Nearer home in Asia, China also suffers from a severe 'Strategic Distrust' with Japan and India. Both Japan and India are Asia's major contending powers against China and strategic partners of United States and therefore cannot throw any lifelines to China.

China is however unlikely to submit to US dictates without a bitter fight. To breakout from its external and internal siege, China can be expected to generate serious security challenges for United States and its Allies hoping that US President Trump "resiles" from his apparent 'China Containment' strategy and also force Russia to take sides.

 And herein lies China's foremost foreign policy challenge in 2025 and how it navigates through these geopolitical uncertainties? 

Contextually, current geopolitical configurations do not offer any possibilities of any Major Global Players siding with China, externally and internally besieged.